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This dissertation consists of three essays.  The first essay finds that small firms in 
poor quality legal environments (poor quality contract enforcement and property 
rights environments) are more financially constrained relative to small firms in better 
quality legal environments.  Consequently, financial development, that is, the 
emergence of venture capitalists, has a greater effect on small firms' access to external 
financing in poor quality legal environments. 
The second essay finds that the quality of contract enforcement is a risk factor, while 
the quality of property rights protection is not.  The results indicate that poor quality 
property rights protection hinders the development of informal capital markets; 
hence, there exists a greater need for financial intermediation in such environments.  
These results indicate that venture capital financing should be encouraged in poor 
quality legal environments and provide one rationale for why capital markets in poor 
quality legal environment countries tend to be bank-based. 
The third essay finds that the demand for growth financing is lower in poor quality 
legal environments relative to better quality legal environments.  The existing 
literature has focused on the effect that limited supply of external financing has on 
firm growth rates in poor quality legal environments.  This paper indicates that lower 
firm growth rates in poor quality legal environments may also result from lower 
demand for growth financing.   
The empirical results in all three essays indicate that poor quality legal environments 
primarily affect the development of informal capital markets.  Hence, financial 
intermediation is of greater importance in poor quality legal environments during the 
early stages of a firm’s growth cycle.  This indicates that encouraging the growth of 
venture capital financing, which is better suited to ameliorating moral hazard 
problems (investments in small firms and technology intensive ventures) relative to 
debt or bank financing, will facilitate faster economic growth in poor quality legal 
environments.  Evidence that venture capitalists’ asset allocations are significantly 
and positively associated with long-run country growth rates is provided in the second 
essay. 
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Chapter I
Law, Finance, and Venture
Capitalists’ Asset Allocation
Decisions
Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2005) predict that small firms in
poor quality legal environments are more financially constrained relative to
small firms in better quality legal environments. Hence, they predict that
financial development has more of an eﬀect on small firms’ access to external
financing relative to large firms’ access to external financing in poor quality
legal environments.
In this paper, I examine whether small firms in poor quality legal envi-
ronments (countries characterized by poor quality contract enforcement and
property rights protection) are more financially constrained relative to small
firms in better quality legal environments. The empirical framework adopted
in this paper also enables me to examine whether financial development has
more of an eﬀect on small firms’ access to external financing relative to large
firms’ access to external financing in poor quality legal environments.
I utilize venture capitalists’ propensity to concentrate investments in a par-
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ticular class of firms as a measure of the gap between the demand and supply of
venture capital financing in poor and better quality legal environments. The
propensity to concentrate investments in a particular class of firms is a mea-
sure of the probability of entry by a venture capitalist. Hence, the propensity
to concentrate investments in a particular class of firms is a measure of the
size of economic profits in a particular sector. These economic profits may
exist either because of a gap between the demand and supply of venture cap-
ital financing or due to venture capitalists’ ability to earn risk premiums in
poor quality legal environments. This characterization of the propensity to
concentrate is supported by the finding in Hsu (2004) that entrepreneurs are
more likely to obtain financing from specialized (or more reputable) venture
capitalists, even when financing terms oﬀered by diversified venture capitalists
are more favorable.
I hypothesize that venture capitalists’ propensity to concentrate invest-
ments in small firms will decrease with the quality of the legal environment
if the gap between demand and supply is greater in poor quality legal envi-
ronments. The sample consists of fourteen emerging and developed countries
where the venture capital market is an emerging market. Hence, the inter-
action between the demand and supply of venture capital financing provides
information about which classes of firms were more disadvantaged with respect
to access to external financing prior to the emergence of venture capitalists.
Moreover, given that venture capital (or private equity financing) is consid-
ered the most expensive source of private financing (Fenn, Liang, and Prowse
(1997)), the results obtained are not necessarily particular to venture capital
financing. Hence, the results can be interpreted to pertain to the gap between
the supply and demand of external financing.
Four broad classes of firms are considered in the paper: early stage technol-
ogy and non-technology intensive ventures (small firms), and later stage tech-
nology and non-technology intensive ventures (relatively large firms, hence-
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forth referred to as large firms). Early stage ventures are in the early stages
of a firm’s growth cycle, while later stage ventures are in the expansion stages
of a firm’s growth cycle.
I find that venture capitalists’ propensity to concentrate investments in
small firms decreases with the quality of the legal environment. This indicates
that the gap between the supply and demand of venture capital financing for
small firms decreases with the quality of the legal environment. A robustness
test based on asset allocations of venture capitalists investing in but located
outside the sample countries also indicates that the gap between the supply
and demand of venture capital financing for small firms decreases with the
quality of the legal environment.
These results are consistent with the prediction in Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt,
Laeven, and Levine (2005) that small firms in poor quality legal environments
are more financially constrained relative to small firms in better quality legal
environments. These results also indicate that financial development, in this
case the emergence of venture capitalists, has more of an eﬀect on small firms’
access to external financing relative to large firms’ access to external financing
in poor quality legal environments.
Amongst small firms, I find that economic profits associated with the fi-
nancing of small non-technology intensive ventures are greater than those asso-
ciated with the financing of small technology intensive ventures in poor quality
legal environments. This finding provides empirical support for the provision
of incentives to venture capitalists in emerging countries to facilitate increased
investments in small technology intensive ventures.
Berger and Udell (1998) estimate that the informal equity or angel investor
market in the U.S. is twice the size of the formal venture capital market. Fur-
thermore, Berger and Udell state that “discussions with industry participants
indicate that most firms that obtain venture capital financing had prior angel
finance”.1 This indicates that angel investors or informal capital markets
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constitute a significant source of external financing for small firms in better
quality legal environments.
The prediction in Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2005) and
the findings in Berger and Udell (1998) suggest that poor quality legal envi-
ronments primarily aﬀect the development of informal capital markets, hence,
the relatively greater need for financial intermediation during the early stages
of a firm’s life cycle. I utilize a switching regression model with endogenous
switching to examine whether there exist significant diﬀerences between poor
and better quality legal environments with respect to the life cycle stages of
firms that obtain venture capital financing. If significant diﬀerences exist, the
switching regression model will be able to distinguish between transactions in
poor and better quality legal environments without any prior specification of
countries characterized by poor quality legal environments.
I find that the switching regression model with endogenous switching is
able to distinguish between venture capital transactions in poor and better
quality legal environments. Venture capital investments in poor quality legal
environments are more likely to be concentrated in early stage (small) ven-
tures, while those in better quality legal environments are more likely to be
concentrated in later stage (large) ventures. Furthermore, venture capital-
ists’ propensity to concentrate investments in small firms decreases with the
quality of the legal environment amongst emerging countries, while venture
capitalists’ propensity to concentrate investments in large firms increases with
the quality of the legal environment amongst developed countries.2
These results indicate that the gap between the demand and supply of
external financing for small firms is greater in poor quality legal environments,
while the gap between the supply and demand of external financing for large
firms is greater in better quality legal environments. Furthermore, the gap
between the demand and supply of venture capital financing for small firms
decreases with the quality of the legal environment amongst both emerging
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and developed countries. These results support the hypothesis that poor
quality legal environments primarily aﬀect the development of informal capital
markets. These results are also consistent with the theoretical framework in
Diamond (1984) for the emergence of a financial intermediary.
Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) find, using data from a sur-
vey, that poor quality legal environments have a greater (adverse) eﬀect on
small firms’ access to growth financing relative to large firms’ access to growth
financing. The results in this paper are consistent with this finding in Beck
et al. (2005). However, this paper diﬀers from Beck et al. (2005) in at least
four respects.
First, the results in this paper also show that small firms in poor quality
legal environments are more financially constrained relative to small firms in
better quality legal environments. Second, the empirical framework adopted
in this paper enables me to conclude that financial development, that is, the
emergence of venture capitalists, has more of an eﬀect on small firms’ access to
external financing relative to large firms’ access to external financing in poor
quality legal environments.
Third, the results obtained from a switching regression model with en-
dogenous switching indicate that poor quality legal environments primarily
aﬀect the development of informal capital markets, which may explain why
banks play a much larger role in poor quality legal environments’ financial
markets. This interpretation of the results suggests that venture capital fi-
nancing should be encouraged in poor quality legal environments. Lastly, the
results in this paper are based on data on the demand and supply of external
financing in poor and better quality legal environments, while the results in
Beck et al. (2005) are based on the subjective responses of entrepreneurs to
questions regarding obstacles that firms encounter with respect to access to
external financing.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I reviews related litera-
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ture. Section II outlines the analytical framework. Section III discusses the
venture capital data from which the variables utilized in empirical tests are
constructed. Test results are reported and interpreted in Section IV. Section
V concludes.
I Related Literature
The law and finance literature finds that the availability of external financing
is linked to the quality of a country’s legal environment. La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) find that financial markets are bet-
ter developed in countries with strong legal frameworks. Similarly, both
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) con-
clude that firms in better quality legal (law and order or contract enforcement)
environments have better access to external financing. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1999) find that capital markets in emerging countries are more
constrained with respect to the availability of long-term funds relative to cap-
ital markets in developed countries.
The empirical tests in all of the papers cited in the preceding paragraph
are based on data for public companies, hence, even the smallest firms in
their samples are quite large. Consequently, the results in these papers may
not necessarily apply to small firms. Moreover, these papers are not able to
examine the division of the gains from financial development between small
and large firms. This paper, on the other hand, examines how poor quality
legal environments aﬀect small firms’ access to external financing, as well as
the division of the gains from financial development between small and large
firms.
Ueda (2004) predicts that venture capitalists will be more likely to invest
in high risk, high growth, and low collateral value ventures. Similarly, Fluck
(1998) predicts that debt is sub-optimal relative to equity for firms character-
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ized by relatively more severe moral hazard problems (high growth, high risk
and low collateral value ventures). The results in Gompers (1995) indicate
that U.S. venture capitalists’ asset allocation decisions are consistent with the
predictions in Ueda (2004) and Fluck (1998).
The quality of contract enforcement is expected to aﬀect venture capitalists’
asset allocation decisions given that venture capital transactions involve a lot
of contractual clauses, which cannot be credible if they can’t be enforced. For
instance, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) find that control rights are separately
allocated in venture capital contracts with the allocation largely dependent on
investment outcomes. This contingent allocation of control rights may not
be credible or enforceable in countries characterized by poor quality contract
enforcement or property rights protection. Hence, poor quality legal envi-
ronments may skew venture capitalists’ asset allocations towards relatively
less risky ventures, or asset allocations that are sub-optimal relative to the
prediction in Ueda (2004).
II Analytical Framework
Venture capitalists’ propensity to concentrate investments in a particular class
of firms is utilized as a proxy for economic profits associated with investing in
that class of firms. Economic profits may exist either because supply lags de-
mand or due to venture capitalists’ ability to earn risk premiums for providing
financing in poor quality legal environments. The probability that venture
capitalists will specialize in providing financing to a particular class of firms,
j, increases with the size of economic profits associated with the provision
of financing to j-type firms. Hence, if economic profits associated with the
provision of financing to j-type firms are greater than those associated with
k-type firms, venture capitalists will have a greater propensity to concentrate
investments in j-type firms relative to k-type firms.
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This argument also extends across countries whenever capital markets are
not segmented. If economic profits associated with the provision of venture
capital financing to j-type firms are greater in country m relative to country
n, venture capitalists in country m will have a greater propensity to concen-
trate investments in j-type firms relative to venture capitalists in country n.
Hence, the prediction in Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2005)
that small firms are more financially constrained in poor quality legal envi-
ronments implies that venture capitalists in poor quality legal environments
have a greater propensity to concentrate investments in small firms relative to
venture capitalists in better quality legal environments.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
A Propensity to concentrate investments in small firms
Hypothesis 1 Small firms in poor quality legal environments are more finan-
cially constrained relative to small firms in better quality legal environments.
Hence, venture capitalists in poor quality legal environments have a greater
propensity to concentrate investments in small firms relative to venture capi-
talists in better quality legal environments.
Hypothesis one is tested using probit models, which are specified as follows:
probability(j-typei) = β0 + β1growthj,c + β2lawenforcementj,c
+ β3bankregulationj,c + β4marketstructurej,c + β5propertyrightsj,c
+ β6firmyeari + β7firmtypei + β8entrepreneurshipj,c
+ β9fundcountryi + β10firstyearj + ²i. (I.1)
The subscript j, c refers to company j located in country c,3 while the
subscript i refers to a venture capitalist providing financing. The dependent
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variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capitalist’s invest-
ments are concentrated in j-type firms. Four classes of j-type firms are con-
sidered. These are early stage non-technology intensive ventures; early stage
technology intensive ventures; later stage non-technology intensive ventures;
and later stage technology intensive ventures. Early stage ventures are in the
early stages of a firm’s growth cycle (small firms), while later stages are in
the expansion stages of a firm’s growth cycle (relatively large firms). Agency
problems associated with investing in early stage and technology intensive ven-
tures are relatively more severe than those associated with investing in later
stage and non-technology intensive ventures. Appendix A (Table AII) details
the specific classes that make up these broad groupings.
Concentration in early stage non-technology intensive ventures is deter-
mined as follows. For each venture capital fund in the sample with investments
in non-technology intensive ventures, I determine total dollar disbursements
to all non-technology intensive ventures in its portfolio as well as proportions
of the total disbursed to early stage non-technology intensive ventures. I then
divide the venture capital funds into three terciles based on the proportion
of their total investments disbursed to early stage non-technology intensive
ventures and venture capital funds located in the third tercile are deemed to
be ‘concentrated’ in early stage non-technology intensive ventures. Concen-
tration is similarly determined for all other classes of j-type firms.
The variable lawenforcement is a country’s ranking on the contract en-
forcement index developed by the Business Environmental Risk Guide (BERG),
while propertyrights is a country’s ranking on the property rights protection
index obtained from LLSV (1998). These variables are motivated in Section I.
Following, I motivate the other independent variables included in the empirical
tests. Detailed descriptions of all variables are provided in Table AI in the
Appendix, while correlations between the independent variables are reported
in Table AIV.
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Country growth rates The financial development literature finds that fi-
nancial development is strongly linked with economic growth. This literature
includes King and Levine (1993), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Luintel
and Khan (1999). This link between financial development and faster eco-
nomic implies that faster economic growth may lead to the development of a
venture capital market. Furthermore, venture capitalists will be more likely
to concentrate investments in industries that are responsible for faster eco-
nomic growth. In this paper, I include GDP growth rates as an independent
variable that proxies for country-specific growth opportunities. This variable
is termed growth.
Banking regulation Obrimah (2004) finds that commercial banks in the
U.S. that set up venture capital operations in-house hold less risky portfolios
relative to those that enter the venture capital market by setting up a venture
capital fund. This suggests that the probability of concentration in low agency
cost ventures may be higher in countries where banks are allowed to hold the
equity of non-financial firms. The banking regulation variable ranks countries
on a scale of one through four. A ranking of one indicates that commercial
banks are free to hold the equity of non-financial firms, while a ranking of
two indicates that they can only do this within an independent subsidiary.
A ranking higher than two indicates more restrictions on commercial banks’
abilities to hold non-financial equity. I obtain country classifications based
on this banking regulation from Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2001). This
variable is termed bankregulation.
Market structure Black and Gilson (1998) find that capital market struc-
ture (market-based versus bank-based) is a determinant of the level of venture
capital activity across countries. In market-based economies, the incentive of
an IPO exit, which creates a liquid asset for the entrepreneur increases the de-
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mand for venture capital funds, which in turn leads to a greater supply of ven-
ture capital funds and a higher level of venture capital activity. Since higher
demand results in more competition, venture capitalists in more market-based
economies are expected to concentrate investments in ventures characterized
by more severe agency problems. Hence, the propensity to concentrate in-
vestments in high agency cost ventures is expected to increase with the extent
to which capital markets are market-based. The market structure variable is
constructed as the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. This variable
is termed marketstructure.
Entrepreneurship Given that I only observe completed deals, there is a
need to account for possible diﬀerences in deal flow across countries. Conse-
quently, I include measures of the propensity to take risks, or the propensity
for entrepreneurship in the tests implemented. These variables are taken from
the Global Competitiveness Report published by the World Economic Forum.
The two variables considered, one for the propensity to take risks and the
other for the propensity to innovate have a correlation of 0.83. Both variables
have similar eﬀects when included in the tests implemented, but only results
with the propensity for entrepreneurship/innovation are reported. These are
continuous variables and the entrepreneurship/innovation variable is termed
entrepreneurship.
Location of venture capital fund The variable fundcountry is an indi-
cator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in an emerging
country (equivalently, poor quality legal environment). A positive regression
coeﬃcient (β9) on this variable indicates that venture capitalists in poor qual-
ity legal environments have a greater propensity to concentrate investments
in j-type firms relative to venture capitalists in better quality legal environ-
ments. Hence, this variable indicates whether economic profits that accrue
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to venture capitalists are greater in poor quality legal environments relative
to better quality legal environments. If the coeﬃcient of fundcountry is
significant with the expected sign (positive), while the quality of legal envi-
ronment variables are not, this suggests that economic profits in poor quality
legal environments are also driven by venture capitalists’ ability to earn risk
premiums.
Venture capital fund related variables Venture capital firm specific
variables are included as independent variables in the tests implemented.
firmtype is the organizational form of a venture capital firm, which has
been shown to contain information about venture capitalists’ risk preferences
(Obrimah (2004), Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri (2003)). Appendix A (Table
AIII) reports the classification of venture capitalists according to organiza-
tional form. firmyear is the year in which a venture capital firm commenced
operations. This variable is included in the empirical tests because it is ex-
pected that venture capitalists’ asset allocations are aﬀected by how long they
have been in business. firstyear is a dummy variable for the year in which a
financing relationship commenced. This variable accounts for possible changes
in venture capitalists’ investment opportunity sets over time.
Venture capital firm reputation The number of deals a venture capitalist
has participated in is utilized as a weight in the tests performed. This is based
on the following argument. Suppose at time t = 0, there exist four VCs (vca,
vcb, vcc and vcd), one of which (vca) is concentrated in technology intensive
ventures, while the others are not. Assume that at time t = 1, the demand for
venture capital financing from technology intensive ventures increases signifi-
cantly. Given that reputation and specialization are important in the venture
capital market,4 vca attracts a significant chunk of the increased demand, but
due to risk considerations is only able to soak up half of the increased demand.
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vcb, on the other hand, is able to soak up more of the residual demand (35
percent) relative to vcc and vcd and ends up being classified as a concentrated
VC at time t = 1.
If vca and vcb are given equal weight in the empirical tests at t = 1,
vcb’s importance is overstated, while vca’s importance is understated. Hence,
in order to capture the demand dynamics, which is central to the research
question, it is important to capture the relative importance of vca and vcb.
The same argument applies to the country variables. If the demand for venture
capital financing is greater in better quality property rights environments,
then there may be more financing transactions in these countries and this
ought to be reflected in the empirical tests. This argument is supported by
the finding in Rajan and Zingales (1998) that financial development has a
significant impact on the growth of the number of firms. All empirical tests,
except the switching regressions are based on first financing rounds only.
B The demand-supply equilibrium of venture capital
financing
Berger and Udell (1998) estimate that the informal equity or angel investor
market in the U.S. is twice the size of the formal venture capital market. Fur-
thermore, Berger and Udell state that “discussions with industry participants
indicate that most firms that obtain venture capital financing had prior an-
gel finance”.5 This indicates that angel investors or informal equity markets
constitute a significant source of external financing for early stage ventures in
better quality legal environments. This finding, coupled with the prediction
in Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2005) that small firms in poor
quality legal environments are more financially constrained relative to small
firms in better quality legal environments suggests that poor quality legal en-
vironments primarily aﬀect the development of informal capital markets.
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If poor quality legal environments primarily aﬀect the development of in-
formal capital markets, venture capitalists’ propensity to concentrate invest-
ments in small firms will decrease with the quality of the legal environment
amongst both emerging and developed countries. It is also expected that ven-
ture capitalists in poor quality legal environments have a greater propensity
to concentrate investments in small firms, while those in better quality legal
environments have a greater propensity to concentrate investments in large
firms. This leads to the following hypothesis, which is consistent with but
expands on hypothesis one:
Hypothesis 2 Venture capitalists in poor quality legal environments have a
greater propensity to concentrate investments in small firms and this propen-
sity decreases with the quality of the legal environment. Venture capitalists
in better quality legal environments have a greater propensity to concentrate
investments in large firms, and this propensity increases with the quality of the
legal environment.
Hypothesis two is tested using a switching regression model with endoge-
nous switching. The switching regression model examines whether there are
significant structural diﬀerences in the demand-supply equilibrium of venture
capital financing between emerging and developed countries with respect to
the life cycle characteristics of portfolio companies. Let X be a vector of inde-
pendent variables, Y a vector of dependent variables, β a vector of regression
coeﬃcients and Z a vector of independent variables. Let particular elements
of these vector variables be represented by corresponding lower case represen-
tations. Then, a switching regression model with endogenous switching is
defined as follows:6
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y1i = Xiβ1 + υ1i (I.2a)
y2i = Xiβ2 + υ2i (I.2b)
I∗i = Ziγ − ²i (I.2c)
Ii = 1 iﬀ I
∗
i > 0 (I.3a)
Ii = 0 iﬀ I
∗
i ≤ 0 (I.3b)
The observed yi is defined as
yi = y1i iﬀ Ii = 1 (I.4a)
yi = y2i iﬀ Ii = 0 (I.4b)
(υ1, υ2, ²)0 ∼ N(0,Σ). (I.4c)
Equations (I.2a) and (I.2b) are the two hypothesized regimes that can-
not be distinguished from the subject data. That is, only yi is observed.
The function I∗i represents some initial guess of the partition of the two en-
dogenous regression regimes while equations (I.3a) and (I.3b) represent the
switching equation that allocates the dependent variable to two diﬀerent but
unobserved regimes as specified in equations (I.4a) and (I.4b). Equation (I.2a)
is referred to as the first component regression generated by the switching re-
gression, while equation (I.2b) is the second component regression generated
by the switching regression. In this set up, v1i, v2i and ²i have well defined
distributions on the whole population.
In this paper, I∗i > 0 for developed countries, while I
∗
i ≤ 0 for emerging
countries per World Bank classifications. Also, I∗i > 0 if bankregulation = 1
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(no restriction on banks’ ability to hold non-financial equity), while I∗i ≤ 0 if
bankregulation ≥ 2 (increasing level of restrictions on banks’ ability to hold
non-financial equity). The vector Z is made up of two variables, the quality
of the law and order environment, lawj,c and GDP growth (growthj,c). The
dependent variable in the model being examined for regime shifts (the main
equation) are the three terciles of concentration in non-technology intensive
ventures (nonhitechqti). The regression model (main equation) from which
the two component regressions are generated is specified as follows:
nonhitechqti = α0 + α1agej + α2earlyj + α3markettobookj
+ α4tangibleassetsj + α5publicj + α6onetimej,i
+ α7firstyearj + α8gdppercapitaj,c + α9firmyeari
+ α10capitali + α11firmtypei + υi. (I.5)
The switch equation, which serves as the initial guess of the two component
regressions is specified as follows:
gdppercapitaj,c = ω0 + ω1lawj,c + ω2growthj,c + ²i. (I.6)
The main equation and the switch equation are similarly specified for tests
where bankregulation is utilized as the switch variable. Independent variables
are as follows: age is the age of a portfolio company when it received financing;
early is an indicator variable equal to one if a portfolio company was in the
early stages of a firm’s life cycle when it received financing; markettobook are
industry market-to-book ratios, while tangibleassets are industry ratios of tan-
gible assets to total assets. The markettobook and tangibleassets ratios are
computed based on firm 2-digit SIC codes obtained from Compustat’s Global
Vantage database; the ratios proxy for possible diﬀerences in the level of asym-
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metric information between non-technology intensive ventures in emerging and
developed countries (Titman and Wessels (1988)).
The variable public is an indicator variable equal to one if a portfolio com-
pany eventually went public. This variable proxies for diﬀerences between
emerging and developed countries with respect to exit strategies (Cumming
and McIntosh (2002)), which may aﬀect venture capitalists’ asset allocation
decisions. The variable onetime is an indicator variable equal to one if a fi-
nancing relationship consists of only one financing round; this variable proxies
for diﬀerences in the use of staged financing between emerging and developed
countries; capital is a venture capital firm’s capital under management in mil-
lions of dollars, which may aﬀect venture capitalists’ decisions to concentrate
investments in a particular class of firms; law ranks the quality of the law
and order environment across countries; this variable is obtained from LLSV
(1998). All other variables are as described in the preceding subsection.
III Venture capital data
Venture capital markets in the sample countries are emerging markets that
for the most part, developed concurrently and experienced significant growth
starting in the late 1990s. Hence, diﬀerences in venture capitalists’ asset allo-
cation decisions cannot be attributed to diﬀerences in the relative maturities of
the venture capital markets in these countries. Furthermore, venture capital
markets in the sample emerging and developed countries are not segmented.
In fact, venture capitalists in some developed countries (Singapore and Hong
Kong in particular) raise venture capital funds for investments in the sample
emerging countries.7
Data on venture capital transactions are obtained from VentureXpert,
which is owned by Ventureeconomics. The cross-country data set consists
of 6,552 distinct venture capital investments during 4,264 distinct rounds of
17
venture financing. Venture capital firms located in the sample countries are
responsible for 67 percent of all sample transactions (4,200 observations), while
venture capitalists located primarily in the U.S. and the U.K. are responsible
for 33 percent of all sample transactions (2,352 observations).
These investments involve 2,857 portfolio companies located in Asia and
Israel that received their first round of funding from venture capitalists (VCs)
between 1982 and December 2000. The developed countries based on World
Bank classifications are: Australia, Hong Kong (China), New Zealand, Japan
and Singapore; while the emerging countries are: China, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Malaysia, Philippines, Korea, Republic, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.
This sample is obtained from a total database of 10,192 venture capital
and private equity transactions. From this total sample, I eliminate:
1. All buyout transactions, since these are not standard venture capital
transactions (1,042 observations);
2. All venture capital relationships that did not commence prior to De-
cember 31, 2000 (1,815 observations); this ensures that I have at least
two-and-a-half years of data on each financing relationship;
3. All investments in the financial services industry (180 observations); as
well as any observation that does not specify the dollar value of each
round investment; the investment stage; the industry; and the name of
the portfolio company (603 observations).
This process resulted in the elimination of 3,640 data records. These in-
vestments involve 818 venture capital firms with 465 or 57 percent of these
venture capital firms located in the sample countries.8 Table I reports indus-
try and investment stage statistics by sample country for this data set. The
statistics reported in Table I indicate that technology intensive deals outnum-
ber non-technology intensive deals in practically all of the sample countries
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regardless of the location of the venture capitalists providing financing. Also,
later stage deals outnumber early stage financing deals across all sample coun-
tries regardless of the location of the venture capitalists providing financing.
Panels A and B of Table II show that venture capitalists in poor quality
legal environments invest smaller amounts in a larger number of firms relative
to venture capitalists in better quality legal environments. On average, the
number of firms in emerging country-based venture capitalists’ portfolios is
2x the number of firms in developed country-based venture capitalists’ port-
folios. The amount disbursed by emerging country-based venture capitalists
to a single firm are about 0.2x to 0.33x the amounts disbursed by developed
country-based venture capitalists. This is consistent with test-of-means statis-
tics reported in Panel C of Table II, which indicate that average capital under
management for emerging country-based venture capital firms is about 0.38x
average capital under management for developed country-based venture capi-
tal firms. These means are significantly diﬀerent at the 5 percent confidence
level.
About thirty percent of portfolio companies are non-technology intensive
companies in the cross-country sample. This proportion is very similar to
that reported in Obrimah (2004) for VCs in the U.S. Total funding com-
mitted to all sample companies amounts to $1.56 billion, with 31 percent (61
percent) being disbursed to non-technology intensive (respectively, technology
intensive) ventures.
Independent private partnerships, corporate venture funds and commercial
bank-aﬃliated venture capitalists (VCs), in that order, are responsible for most
of the sample transactions. All venture capital types invest in non-technology
intensive companies. The venture capital types with the largest proportions
of non-technology intensive companies in their portfolios are commercial bank-
aﬃliated VCs (33 percent), independent private partnerships (26 percent) and
corporate VCs (15 percent). Investments in early stage companies constitute
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between 29 percent (for investment bank-aﬃliated VCs) and 60 percent (for
government-aﬃliated VCs) of all investment transactions.
Forty-three percent of sample portfolio companies are early stage ventures
at the first round of venture financing. Early stage ventures constitute a
significant minority amongst non-technology intensive ventures (32 percent),
a slight minority amongst technology intensive ventures (47 percent) and a
significant majority amongst medical/health-related ventures (60 percent). A
total of $780 million was disbursed to portfolio companies receiving their first
round of venture capital financing and 31 percent of this total went to early
stage ventures.
Syndication is not very prevalent within this sample. Deals involving
syndications between the diﬀerent classes of VCs are also very few. The
percentage of deals involving independent private partnerships and at least one
other venture capital class range from 8 percent for commercial bank aﬃliated
VCs, to 16 percent for investment bank aﬃliated VCs. Syndication with
other classes of VCs, other than independent private partnerships is even less
prevalent. The proportion of deals involving a single class of VCs ranges from
79 percent for investment bank aﬃliated VCs, to 91 percent for independent
private partnerships. This lack of extensive syndication may be rational in
markets that are far from perfect, since information rents are likely to exist in
such markets.9
IV Results and Interpretations
Test results reported in Table III indicate that the propensity to concentrate
investments in early stage non-technology intensive ventures decreases with
the extent to which property rights are protected. That is, the gap between
the supply and demand of external financing for this class of firms is relatively
greater in poor quality property rights environments. The quality of contract
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enforcement, on the other hand, has no eﬀect on the gap between the supply
and demand of external financing for this class of firms.
However, venture capitalists in poor quality contract enforcement environ-
ments are significantly more likely to concentrate investments in early stage
non-technology intensive ventures relative to venture capitalists in better qual-
ity contract enforcement environments. This indicates that economic profits
associated with investing in this class of firms are relatively greater in poor
quality contract enforcement environments, suggesting that venture capital-
ists in poor quality contract enforcement environments are able to earn risk
premiums for providing financing to this class of firms.
The coeﬃcient of the fundcountry variable indicates that venture capital
funds in emerging countries are significantly more likely to concentrate in-
vestments in early stage non-technology intensive ventures relative to those
in developed countries. This diﬀerence, which is between 28 percent and 41
percent, is economically significant. These results are consistent with hypoth-
esis one, which predicts that small firms in poor quality legal environments
are more financially constrained relative to small firms in better quality legal
environments.
A Early stage technology intensive ventures
Table IV reports test results where the dependent variable is concentration
in early stage technology intensive ventures. The results indicate that the
propensity to concentrate investments in early stage technology intensive ven-
tures decreases with the extent to which property rights are protected and
the quality of contract enforcement. Concentration in early stage technology
intensive ventures also decreases with the propensity for entrepreneurship.
These results indicate that the gap between the demand and supply of
external financing for this class of firms is relatively greater in poor quality
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legal environments and low propensity for entrepreneurship countries. The
coeﬃcient of the propensity for entrepreneurship variable suggests that the
lack of financing to fund innovation can adversely aﬀect attitudes towards
innovation or entrepreneurship.
The coeﬃcient of fundcountry indicates that venture capital funds in
emerging countries are significantly more likely to concentrate investments
in early stage technology intensive ventures relative to those in better quality
legal environments. This diﬀerence, which is between 9 percent and 13 per-
cent, is economically significant, though less so relative to that obtained for
early stage non-technology intensive ventures. This indicates that economic
profits associated with investing in early stage non-technology intensive ven-
tures are greater than those associated with investing in early stage technology
intensive ventures in poor quality legal environments. These results are con-
sistent with hypothesis one, which predicts that small firms in poor quality
legal environments are more financially constrained relative to small firms in
better quality legal environments.
B Later stage non-technology intensive ventures
Test results reported in Table V indicate that the propensity to concentrate in-
vestments in later stage non-technology intensive ventures increases with the
quality of contract enforcement and property rights protection, while it de-
creases with the extent to which banks are precluded from holding the equity
of non-financial firms and long-run country growth rates. Concentration in
later stage non-technology intensive ventures also decreases with the propen-
sity for entrepreneurship across countries.
These results indicate that the gap between the supply and demand of
external financing for this class of firms is relatively greater in better quality
legal environments and low propensity for entrepreneurship countries. The
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results also indicate that the gap between the supply and demand of external
financing for later stage non-technology intensive ventures is relatively greater
in countries where banks are allowed to hold the equity of non-financial firms.
This is in line with the finding in Obrimah (2004) that U.S. commercial banks
that set up venture capital operations inhouse hold less risky portfolios relative
to those that set up venture capital funds.
The coeﬃcient of fundcountry indicates, with the exception of specifica-
tion (2), that venture capital funds in poor quality legal environments are sig-
nificantly less likely to concentrate investments in later stage non-technology
intensive ventures relative to those in better quality legal environments. This
diﬀerence, which is between 20 percent and 25 percent, is economically signif-
icant. These results are consistent with hypothesis one, which implies that
large firms in poor quality legal environments are less financially constrained
relative to large firms in better quality legal environments.
C Later stage technology intensive ventures
Table VI reports test results where the dependent variable is concentration
in later stage technology intensive ventures. The results indicate that the
propensity to concentrate investments in later stage technology intensive ven-
tures increases with the extent to which property rights are protected and the
extent to which capital markets are market based.
This indicates that the gap between the supply and demand of external
financing for this class of firms is greater in better quality legal environments.
This also indicates that the gap between the demand and supply of external
financing for this class of firms is larger in market-based capital markets (rel-
ative to bank-based capital markets) in line with the prediction in Black and
Gilson (1998).
The coeﬃcient of fundcountry indicates, except in specification (2), that
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venture capital funds in emerging countries are significantly less likely to con-
centrate investments in later stage technology intensive ventures relative to
those in developed countries. This diﬀerence, which is between 8 percent and
15 percent, is economically significant, though less so relative to that obtained
for later stage non-technology intensive ventures. These results are consis-
tent with hypothesis one, which implies that large firms in poor quality legal
environments are less financially constrained relative to large firms in better
quality legal environments.
D The demand-supply equilibrium of venture capital
financing
Tables VIIA and VIIC report the results from the switching regression model
with endogenous switching. The results indicate that asset allocations of ven-
ture capitalists diﬀer significantly depending on whether they are investing in
emerging or developed countries. The switching regression is able to generate
two diﬀerent component regressions from the data. The switching regres-
sion also generates probabilities that a particular observation is utilized in the
first component regression. Probabilities higher than the mean indicate that
an observation is included in the first component regression. Probabilities
lower than the mean indicate that an observation is included in the second
component regression.
The mean probability that an observation is utilized in the first compo-
nent regression, when the switch variable is gdppercapita is 0.39, while the
corresponding probability is 0.58 for the switching regression that utilizes
bankregulation as the switch variable. Table VIIB, which summarizes the
probabilities by sample country shows that sample emerging countries (poor
quality legal environments) and developed countries (better quality legal en-
vironments) are assigned to diﬀerent component regressions, with the only
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exception being observations from Taiwan, which are assigned to the compo-
nent regressions to which developed country-observations are assigned.10
Although the switch variables are diﬀerent, the coeﬃcients and robust t-
statistics generated in specifications (1) and (4) are practically identical (the
component regressions to which emerging countries are assigned), while those
generated in specifications (2) and (3) are practically identical (the component
regressions to which developed countries are assigned).
The results indicate that there are significant diﬀerences in the asset al-
location decisions of venture capitalists investing in emerging and developed
countries. First, venture capitalists in emerging countries are more likely to
invest in early stage non-technology intensive ventures, while those in devel-
oped countries are more likely to invest in later stage non-technology intensive
ventures. Second, while concentration in early stage non-technology inten-
sive ventures decreases with gdppercapita and increases with bankregulation
amongst emerging countries, concentration in later stage non-technology inten-
sive ventures increases with gdppercapita and decreases with bankregulation
amongst developed countries.
These results indicate that the gap between the supply and demand of
external financing for small firms is greater in poor quality legal environments,
while the gap between the supply and demand of external financing for large
firms is greater in better quality legal environments. The results also indicate
that the gap between the supply and demand of venture capital financing for
small firms decreases with the quality of the legal environment amongst both
emerging and developed countries.
These results are consistent with hypothesis two, which predicts that ven-
ture capitalists in poor quality legal environments are more likely to concen-
trate investments in small firms, while those in better quality legal environ-
ments are more likely to concentrate investments in large firms. The likelihood
ratio test of the restrictions implied by the switching regression model indicates
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that the restrictions implied by the switching equation cannot be rejected at
the one percent confidence level. The ratio of the likelihoods is approximately
0.97.
E Out-of-sample robustness test
I examine the asset allocation decisions of venture capitalists investing in the
sample countries, but located in developed countries outside the region. If
the results obtained in the preceding subsections are driven by gaps between
the supply and demand of external financing, it is expected that this will be
reflected in the asset allocations of venture capitalists investing in but located
outside the sample countries. There are 350 such venture capitalists in all
and 250 (respectively, 72) are based in the United States (United Kingdom).
The test results show that the propensity to concentrate investments in
early stage non-technology intensive ventures decreases with the quality of
contract enforcement and property rights protection for venture capitalists in-
vesting in but located outside the sample countries. Hence, consistent with
the results in the preceding subsections, the gap between the supply and de-
mand of external financing for small firms is greater in poor quality legal
environments. These test results are reported in Table VIII.
F Specification test for probit models
Specification tests indicate that the probit models utilized in the tests are
well specified. The test of goodness-of-fit for the probit model where the
dependent variable is concentration in early stage non-technology ventures
yields a Pearson χ2 statistic of 514.16 that is significant at the one percent
confidence level. A stricter goodness-of-fit test, the Hosmer-Lemeshow11 χ2
goodness of fit statistic yields a test statistic of 55.40, which is significant at
the one percent confidence level.
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Furthermore, using the sample mean third-tercile-concentration of 0.345
as a cutoﬀ point, I find that 72 percent of venture capital firms that are
classified as ‘concentrated’ in early stage non-technology intensive ventures
are correctly predicted by the model, while 73 percent of those classified as
‘not concentrated’ in non-technology intensive ventures are correctly classified.
In all, the model correctly classifies 72.65 percent of the data. All of these
statistics indicate that the probit models are well specified.
V Conclusions
In this paper, I find that venture capitalists in poor quality legal environments
(countries characterized by poor quality contract enforcement and property
rights protection) are more likely to concentrate investments in early stage
(small) ventures, while those in better quality legal environments are more
likely to concentrate investments in later stage (large) ventures. Further-
more, the propensity to concentrate investments in early stage ventures de-
creases with the quality of the legal environment amongst both emerging and
developed countries.
These results indicate that the gap between the demand and supply of
venture capital financing is greater for small firms in poor quality legal envi-
ronments. Furthermore, the gap between the supply and demand of venture
capital financing for small firms decreases with the quality of the legal environ-
ment. These results are in line with the prediction in Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt,
Laeven, and Levine (2005) that small firms are the most constrained with re-
spect to access to external financing in poor quality legal environments. The
results are also consistent with the prediction that financial development, in
this case, the emergence of venture capitalists, has a greater eﬀect on small
firms’ access to external financing in poor quality legal environments.
The results in this paper, coupled with the predictions in Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-
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Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2005) suggest that poor quality legal environments
primarily aﬀect the growth of informal capital markets, hence the relatively
greater need for financial intermediation during the early stages of a firm’s
growth cycle in poor quality legal environments. This interpretation of the
results is consistent with the fact that the informal equity or angel investor
market constitutes a much larger source of financing for small firms in the
U.S. relative to the formal equity or venture capital market (Berger and Udell
(1998)).
Consistent with the findings in Obrimah (2004), I find that the organiza-
tional form adopted by commercial bank aﬃliated venture capitalists contains
information about their risk preferences. In countries where commercial banks
are not precluded from holding the equity of non-financial firms, commercial
bank aﬃliated venture capitalists are more likely to concentrate investments
in later stage ventures. In countries where commercial banks are precluded
from holding the equity of non-financial firms, on the other hand, commercial
bank aﬃliated venture capitalists are more likely to concentrate investments
in early stage ventures or relatively riskier ventures.
The empirical results in this paper are based on the initial or first rounds
of venture capital financing provided to entrepreneurs by venture capitalists.
Firm growth rates, however, may depend on the demand and supply of ven-
ture capital financing after a financing relationship has been established. An
examination of how poor quality legal environments aﬀect the demand for
additional rounds of venture capital financing is a subject for future research.
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Notes
1Berger and Udell (1998, pg. 630).
2In this paper, there exists a one-to-one correspondence between a country’s classification
as a poor quality contract enforcement environment and its classification as an emerging
country.
3Venture capital funds providing financing to company j may be located in diﬀerent
countries.
4Gompers (1996), Hsu (2004)
5Berger and Udell (1998, pg. 630).
6See Maddala (1983) for a detailed discussion of switching regressions with endogenous
switching.
7The Guide to Venture Capital in Asia (2000).
8We note here that discussions with Ventureeconomics indicate that the coverage of Asia
venture capital transactions in the VentureXpert database simply reflects the data that they
have been able to obtain so far and does not represent any bias on their part whatsoever.
The fact that macro characteristics of this unique data set correspond to macro data on
Asian countries and Israel obtained from the GVCA further lends credence to this assertion
9These statistics are not reported, but are available upon request from the author.
10This result provides some support for those who have argued that Taiwan should be
regarded as a developed economy instead of its current classification as an emerging economy.
11The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic is utilized instead of the standard Pear-
son goodness of fit statistic when the number of observations per covariate pattern is small.
In this study, the number of observations per covariate pattern is about 2, hence the Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic provides a stricter goodness of fit test relative to the Pear-
son statistic. In Using the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test, the number of groups is
usually limited to ten.
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A Data descriptions, classifications and sources
Table AI: Data Descriptions and sources
The first 17 variables are associated with venture capital transactions and are obtained from VentureXpert.
Sources are cited for all other variables. Concentration in early stage non-technology intensive ventures
is constructed as follows. For each venture capital fund in the sample with investments in non-technology
intensive ventures, I determine total dollar disbursements to all non-technology intensive ventures in its
portfolio as well as proportions of the total disbursed to early stage non-technology intensive ventures.
I then divide the venture capital funds into three terciles based on the proportion of their total investments
disbursed to early stage non-technology intensive ventures and venture capital funds located in the third
tercile are deemed to be concentrated in early stage non-technology intensive ventures. Concentration in
later stage non-technology intensive ventures; early stage technology intensive ventures; later stage te-
chnology intensive ventures is similarly determined. The three terciles of concentration in non-techno-
logy intensive ventures are also similarly determined.
Symbol Description/Construction
Earlynontechfm Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is concentrated in early stage non-
technology intensive ventures.
Laternontechfm Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is concentrated in later stage non-
technology intensive ventures.
Earlyhitechfm Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is concentrated in early stage
technology intensive ventures.
Laterhitechfm Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is concentrated in later stage
technology intensive ventures.
Onetime Dummy variable = 1 if a financing relationship involves only one round of financing.
Public Dummy variable = 1 if a portfolio company eventually goes public, and 0 otherwise.
Nonhitechqt The three terciles of concentration in non-technology intensive ventures.
Fundcountry Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is located in a sample emerging country.
Age Portfolio company’s age at first round of venture capital financing.
Firmyear The year a venture capital firm commenced operations.
Early Dummy variable = 1 if a portfolio company is in the early stages of a firm’s growth
cycle.
IV C Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is an independent private partnership .
Invbankaffvc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is aﬃliated with an investment bank
continued
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Table AI-Continued
Symbol Description/Construction
Corporatevc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is aﬃliated with a non-financial corp
Commbankaffvc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is aﬃliated with a commercial bank
Govtaffvc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is government-owned or aﬃliated
Capital Venture capital firm-reported capital under management (’$Millions).
Entrepreneurship Country ranking of entrepreneurship and innovation by the World Economic Forum.
Taken from the Global Competitiveness Report (1996). Higher rankings imply higher
innovation capabilities.
Markettobook Industry-wide ratios of market to book value based on 2-digit sic codes. Ratios are
calculated separately for portfolio companies located in the emerging and developed
country sub-samples. Data are obtained from Compustat’s Global Vantage Database.
Tangibleassets Industry-wide ratios of property, plant, and equipment to total assets based on
2-digit sic codes. Ratios are calculated separately for portfolio companies loca-
ted in the emerging and developed country sub-samples. Data are obtained from
Compustat’s Global Vantage Database.
Lawenforcement∗ Measures the relative degree to which contractual agreements are enforced and co-
mplications presented by language and mentality diﬀerences. Scored 1-4, with hig-
her scores for superior quality, averaged over 1980-1989, and 1990- 995; Source: Kn-
ack and Keefer (1995) using data from Business Environmental Risk Guide (BERG).
Growth Annual GDP growth; Source: World Development Indicators (2002).
Propertyrights∗ Rating of property rights on a scale of 1 to 5. The more protection private property
receives, the higher the score. Source: LLSV (1998b), using data from 1997 Index of
Economic Freedom.
Gdppercapita Annual GDP Per Capita obtained from the World Development Indicators (2002).
Marketstructure Constructed as the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP; stock market capi-
talizations are obtained from the Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, while GDP
data are obtained from the World Development Indicators (2002) CD ROM.
Bankregulation∗ Ability of banks to own and control non-financial firms. Source: Barth, Caprio,
and Levine (1998). 1 indicates “unrestricted” (banks can engage in the full ran-
ge of the activity directly in the bank), 2 indicates “permitted” (the full range of
those activities can be conducted, but all or some of the activity must be cond-
ucted in subsidiaries), 3 indicates “restricted” (banks can engage in less than the
full range of those activities, either in the bank or subsidiaries) and 4 indicates
“prohibited” (the activity may not be conducted by the bank or subsidiaries).
* descriptions obtained from Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2001).
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Table AII: Industry and investment stage classifications
This table reports the industry, and investment stage classification
schemes employed in this paper. Hitech are technologically intensi-
ve inventures; Nonhitech are non-technologically intensive ventu-
res; while Medical are medical/health-related ventures. Actual clas-
sifications are obtained from VentureXpert. Portfolio companies in the
Start-up/Seed or Early stages of a firm’s life cycle are firms that are still
in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Firms classified as early
stage firms tend to be older and further on along the firm’s life cycle
relative to those classified as Start-up/Seed firms. Porfolio companies
in the expansion or later stages of a firm’s growth cycle are relatively
established firms who need financing primarily to fund growth oppor-
tunities. These are larger and older firms relative to Early Stage and
Start-up firms. Firms classified as later stage firms tend to be further
along on a firm’s life cycle relative to those classified as expansion
stage firms.
Actual
Classifications Broad Classifications in this paper
Panel A: Industry Classifications
Hitech Nonhitech Medical
Agr/Forestry/Fish ×
Biotechnology ×
Business Services ×
Communications ×
Computer Hardware ×
Computer Other ×
Computer Software ×
Construction ×
Consumer Related ×
Industrial/Energy ×
Internet Specific ×
Manufacturing ×
Medical/Health ×
Other ×
Semiconductor/Electr. ×
Transportation ×
Utilities ×
Panel B: Classifications by Investment Stage
Later Stage Early Stage
Early Stage ×
Expansion ×
Later Stage ×
Startup/Seed ×
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Table AIII: Classification of venture capitalists by organizational structure
This table reports the ‘venture capital type’ classification scheme employed in this paper. The row
items are the actual classifications of venture capital firms by organizational structure. These classi-
fications are obtained from VentureXpert. SBIC NEC are Small Business Investment Companies
(SBICs) not classified within any of the other VentureXpert classes. Fund of funds are venture capi-
tal funds that invest in other venture capital funds rather than investing directly in firms in need of
venture capital financing. All other ‘actual’ classifications are self-explanatory. The Broad classifi-
cations in this paper are five. These are IV C (Independent Venture Capitalist; Invbankaffvc (Invest-
ment Bank aﬃliated venture capitalist); Corporatevc (Corporate venture capitalist; Commbankaffvc
(Commercial Bank aﬃliated venture capitalist); and Govtaffvc (Government aﬃliated venture capitalist).
Actual
Classifications Broad Classifications in this paper
Com-
Invba- Corpo- mban- Govt-
IVC nkaﬀvc ratevc kaﬀvc aﬀvc
Aﬃliate of Other Financial Institution ×
Bank Group ×
Business Development Fund ×
Commercial Bank Aﬃliate ×
Corporate (non-financial) Aﬃliate ×
Corporate (non-financial) Venture Program ×
Investment Management Firm ×
Investment Bank & Aﬃliates ×
Other Government Program ×
Fund of Funds ×
Independent Private Partnership ×
SBIC NEC ×
State Govt. Aﬃliated Program ×
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Table AIV: Correlations Table for the cross-country sample
This table reports correlations between independent variables utilized in this paper. The data
comes from fourteen emerging and developed countries. The developed countries based on
World Bank classifications are: Australia, Hong Kong (China), New Zealand, Japan and Sin-
gapore; while the emerging countries are: China, India, Indonesia ,Israel, Malaysia, Philippines,
Korea, Republic, Taiwan (China) and Thailand. The data consists of 4,200 distinct venture
capital transactions between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists located within the sample
countries. Firmyear is the year a venture capital firm commenced operations; Growth is annual
GDP growth; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement across
countries; Bankregulation is the extent to which commercial banks are precluded from holding the
equity of non-financial firms; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP;
Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries;
Entrepreneurship is a ranking of the propensity for entrepreneurship/innovation across countries;
Fundcountry is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in an emerging
country; Invbankaffvc are Investment Bank aﬃliated venture capitalists; Corporatevc are venture
capitalists aﬃliated with non-financial corporations; Commbankaffvc are Commercial Bank aﬃliated
venture capitalists; Govtaffvc are government aﬃliated venture capitalists; Early is an indicator
variable equal to one if a firm was in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle when it received its
first round of financing; Gdppercapita is annual GDP Per Capita.
Lawe- Bank- Mark- Entre-
Firm- nforc- regu- etstru- Proper- prene-
year Growth ement lation cture tyrights urship
Firmyear 1.0000
Growth 0.1338 1.0000
Lawenforcement 0.0425 -0.5028 1.0000
Bankregulation -0.0994 0.6686 -0.6043 1.0000
Marketstructure 0.0336 -0.4845 0.7267 0.4052 1.0000
Propertyrights 0.2298 0.3707 0.4990 -0.1151 0.2933 1.0000
Entrepreneurship 0.1021 0.1262 -0.4193 -0.3299 -0.4199 -0.2764 1.0000
Fundcountry 0.0456 0.5692 -0.7865 0.3856 -0.7633 -0.3428 0.6220
Invbankaﬀvc -0.0246 -0.2964 0.1518 -0.2206 0.1402 -0.0799 -0.0116
Corporatevc 0.0806 0.1899 -0.0375 0.1034 0.0102 0.0986 0.0168
Commbankaﬀvc -0.1864 -0.0469 -0.2134 0.1313 -0.1306 -0.3308 0.0842
Govtaﬀvc -0.2620 -0.0029 -0.0484 0.1112 -0.0499 -0.0990 -0.0634
Early -0.0091 0.0564 -0.1197 0.0735 -0.0871 -0.0954 0.0878
Gdppercapita 0.1036 -0.2073 0.8987 -0.4031 0.5648 0.7253 -0.5220
Fund- Invb- Cor- Com- Gdpp-
coun- anka- pora- mban Govt- perc-
try ﬀvc tevc kaﬀvc aﬀvc Early apita
Fundcountry 1.0000
Invbankaﬀvc -0.1904 1.0000
Corporatevc 0.0688 -0.1250 1.0000
Commbankaﬀvc 0.1919 -0.1677 -0.1408 1.0000
Govtaﬀvc -0.1462 -0.1051 -0.0883 -0.1184 1.0000
Early 0.1479 -0.0999 0.0531 0.0454 0.1281 1.0000
Gdppercapita -0.6736 0.0418 0.0133 -0.2834 -0.0422 -0.1217 1.0000
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Table I: Summary statistics for venture capital data by country
This table reports the industry, and investment stage distribution of the venture capital data
utilized in this paper. These data are obtained from VentureXpert and consist of 6,552 venture
capital transactions between entrepreneurs located in the fourteen sample countries and (1)
venture capitalists located in these sample countries (sample VCs); and (2) venture capitalists
located primarily in the U.S. and the U.K.(‘Other VCs’). Hitech are technology intensive ven-
tures; Nonhitech are non-technology intensive ventures; and Medical are medical or health
related ventures. Early Stage firms are firms in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle, while
Later Stage firms are firms in the expansion stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Details of industries
classified as Hitech, Nonhitech or Medical as well as firms classified as early stage or later stage
firms are provided in Table AII of the Appendix.
Transactions with sample VCs Transactions with other VCs
Panel A: Data descriptions by country and industry classification
Hit- Med- Nonhi- Hit- Med- Nonhi-
Country ech ical tech ech ical tech Total
Australia 444 122 287 160 34 90 1,137
China 72 15 34 100 11 39 271
Hong Kong 84 45 143 40 312
India 389 69 319 180 8 33 998
Indonesia 12 1 18 7 18 56
Israel 187 64 8 460 135 22 876
Japan 65 10 49 91 15 140 370
Korea 1,076 138 249 213 24 36 1,736
Malaysia 24 1 12 6 2 13 58
New Zealand 30 4 21 16 9 80
Philippines 9 7 8 25 49
Singapore 106 6 26 122 16 32 308
Taiwan 139 1 36 65 1 22 264
Thailand 4 13 6 5 9 37
Total 2,644 431 1,125 1,577 251 528 6,552
Panel B: Data descriptions by country and investment stage classification
Later Early Later Early
Country Stage Stage Stage Stage Total
Australia 577 276 181 103 1,137
China 72 49 94 56 271
Hong Kong 100 29 141 42 312
India 368 409 134 87 998
Indonesia 28 3 19 6 56
Israel 156 103 352 265 876
Japan 90 34 172 74 370
Korea 817 646 146 127 1,736
Malaysia 21 16 16 5 58
New Zealand 45 10 25 80
Philippines 15 1 26 7 49
Singapore 86 52 117 53 308
Taiwan 157 19 62 26 264
Thailand 12 5 10 10 37
Total 2,547 1,653 1,495 861 6,552
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Table II: Industry- and investment stage-based test-of-means results
This table reports the results of industry and investment stage based test-of-means. The data
consists of 4,200 funding transactions between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists located
within the sample countries from 1982 to 2003. Nonhitech are non-technology intensive ven-
tures, Hitech are technology intensive ventures, while Health Related are medical/health related
ventures. Early Stage firms are firms in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Later Stage
firms are firms in the expansion stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Capital is total capital under
management by a venture capital firm (includes funds committed to venture capitalists but not
yet disbursed and investments from which venture capitalists are yet to exit). t− stats are
the t-statistics associated with the test-of-means. The test-of-means does not assume that the
variances of the two groups utilized in the tests are equal. All numbers are actual except noted
otherwise.
Mean Values
# of Developed Emerging
Item obs. Country Country t-stats
Panel A: Mean number of portfolio companies by industry and investment stage classification
Later Stage & Nonhitech 361 21.73 36.49 -6.517∗∗∗
Early Stage & Nonhitech 102 15.84 32.25 -4.443∗∗∗
Later Stage & Hitech 770 16.98 35.7 -12.064∗∗∗
Early Stage & Hitech 497 15.28 34.34 -10.213∗∗∗
Later Stage & Health Related 91 20.83 31.65 -2.152∗∗∗
Early Stage & Health Related 78 9.35 42.39 -6.440∗∗∗
Panel B: Mean per company investment by industry and investment stage classification ($’000s)
Later Stage & Nonhitech 361 5,507 1,340 1.447
Early Stage & Nonhitech 102 3,650 625 -2.541∗∗
Later Stage & Hitech 770 7,751 2,279 5.733∗∗∗
Early Stage & Hitech 497 6,132 2,126 4.246∗∗∗
Later Stage & Health Related 91 6,806 4,721 1.246
Early Stage & Health Related 78 5,082 2,532 1.178
Panel C: Mean venture capital firm capitalization ($ Millions) and number of venture funds
Capital 177 192 73 3.208∗∗∗
# of funds per venture capital firm 1899 2.698 4.273 -12.722∗∗∗
*** indicates significance at the 1%, confidence level
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Table III: Concentration in early stage non-technology intensive ventures
The probit model estimated is
Earlynontechfm = β0 + β1growth+ β2Lawenforcement+ β3Bankregulation
+ β4Marketstructure+ β5Propertyrights+ β6Firmyear
+β7Firmtype+ β8Entrepreneurship+ β9Fundcountry
+β10Firstyear + ².
Earlynontechfm is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital fund’s investments are
concentrated in early stage non-technology intensive ventures. Growth is the growth rate of
GDP; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement across countries;
Bankregulation is the extent to which commercial banks are precluded from holding the equity
of non-financial firms; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP;
Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries; Firmyear
is the year a venture firm was founded; Firmtype is a venture capital firm’s organizational form
(IV C, Invbankaffvc, Corporatevc, Commbankaffvc, and Govtaffvc); Entrepreneurship
is a ranking of the propensity for entrepreneurship across countries; Fundcountry is an indi-
cator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in an emerging country; Firstyear
is the yeara portfolio company received its first round of venture capital financing. Data on
venture capital transactions are obtained from VentureXpert and consist of 4,200 funding
transactions between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs located in Asia and the Middle
East from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects (mean eﬀects), while
z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear -.00736 -.00657 -.0104 -.00768 -.00922
(-2.13)∗∗ (-1.89)∗ (-3.22)∗∗∗ (-2.22)∗∗ (-2.89)∗∗∗
Growth .000387
(0.05)
Lawenforcement .0171
(0.21)
Bankregulation .0603
(1.09)
Marketstructure .0372
(0.49)
Propertyrights -.1819
(-5.77)∗∗∗
Entrepreneurship -.0907 -.1073 -.1204 -.1329 -.0801
(-1.49) (-1.31) (-1.49) (-1.68)∗ (-1.04)
Fundcountry .3915 .3993 .4066 .4105 .2841
(8.22)∗∗∗ (5.70)∗∗∗ (7.00)∗∗∗ (6.55)∗∗∗ (5.08)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc .00541 .0352 .00899 .0205 -.1645
(0.07) (0.43) (0.11) (0.27) (-2.00)∗∗
Corporatevc .0367 .0587 .0375 .0407 .0728
(0.46) (0.70) (0.45) (0.51) (0.85)
Commbankaﬀvc .0520 .0893 .0471 .0764 -.0474
(0.57) (0.95) (0.51) (0.85) (-0.50)
Govtaﬀvc .3112 .3352 .4054 .3132 .3154
(4.29)∗∗∗ (4.67)∗∗∗ (5.10)∗∗∗ (4.41)∗∗∗ (3.87)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.1787 0.1595 0.2150 0.1767 0.2565
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 732 696 690 746 690
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
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Table IV: Concentration in early stage technology intensive ventures
The probit model estimated is
Earlytechfm = β0 + β1growth+ β2Lawenforcement+ β3Bankregulation
+ β4Marketstructure+ β5Propertyrights+ β6Firmyear
+ β7Firmtype+ β8Entrepreneurship+ β9Fundcountry
+β10Firstyear + ².
Earlytechfm is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital fund’s investments are
concentrated in early stage technology intensive ventures. Growth is the growth rate of
GDP; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement across countries;
Bankregulation is the extent to which commercial banks are precluded from holding the
equity of non-financial firms; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to
GDP; Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries;
Firmyear is the year a venture firm was founded; Firmtype is a venture capital firm’s orga-
nizational form (IV C, Invbankaffvc, Corporatevc, Commbankaffvc, and Govtaffvc);
Entrepreneurship is a ranking of the propensity for entrepreneurship across countries;
Fundcountry is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in
an emerging country; Firstyear is the year a portfolio company received its first round of
venture capital financing. Data on venture capital transactions are obtained from Venture-
Xpert and consist of 4,200 funding transactions between venture capitalists and entrepre-
neurs located in Asia and the Middle East from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the
marginal eﬀects (mean eﬀects), while z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear -.00175 -.00230 -.00191 -.00153 -.00188
(-1.34) (-1.79)∗ (-1.37) (-1.16) (-1.37)
Growth .00214
(0.44)
Lawenforcement -.0939
(-1.72)∗
Bankregulation .0172
(0.62)
Marketstructure -.0102
(-0.24)
Propertyrights -.0751
(-3.96)∗∗∗
Entrepreneurship -.1099 -.1254 .0250 -.1043 -.00986
(-2.82)∗∗∗ (-2.60)∗∗∗ (0.42) (-2.42)∗∗ (-0.19)
Fundcountry .1255 .0929 .1207 .1213 .1011
(3.86)∗∗∗ (1.69)∗ (3.40)∗∗∗ (2.81)∗∗∗ (3.01)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc .0894 .0864 .0609 .0843 -.0102
(2.09)∗∗ (2.00)∗∗ (1.45) (2.04)∗∗ (-0.24)
Corporatevc -.0206 -.0342 -.0570 -.0170 -.0496
(-0.52) (-0.83) (-1.37) (-0.43) (-1.20)
Commbankaﬀvc .0144 .0202 -.00912 .0147 -.0175
(0.21) (0.28) (-0.13) (0.21) (-0.24)
Govtaﬀvc .1890 .1541 .2197 .1874 .1917
(4.13)∗∗∗ (3.33)∗∗∗ (4.60)∗∗∗ (4.12)∗∗∗ (3.92)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.0685 0.0746 0.0801 0.0717 0.0889
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 1725 1663 1563 1735 1563
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively
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Table V: Concentration in later stage non-technology intensive ventures
The probit model estimated is
Laternontechfm = β0 + β1growth+ β2Lawenforcement+ β3Bankregulation
+ β4Marketstructure+ β5Propertyrights+ β6Firmyear
+ β7Firmtype+ β8Entrepreneurship+ β9Fundcountry
+ β10Firstyear + ².
Laternontechfm is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital fund’s investments are
concentrated in later stage non-technology intensive ventures. Growth is the growth rate of
GDP; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement across countries;
Bankregulation is the extent to which commercial banks are precluded from holding the
equity of non-financial firms; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to
GDP; Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries;
Firmyear is the year a venture firm was founded; Firmtype is a venture capital firm’s organi-
zational form (IV C, Invbankaffvc, Corporatevc, Commbankaffvc, and Govtaffvc);
Entrepreneurship is a ranking of the propensity for entrepreneurship across countries;
Fundcountry is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in an
emerging country; Firstyear is the year a portfolio company received its first round of ven-
ture capital financing. Data on venture capital transactions are obtained from VentureXpert
and consist of 4,200 funding transactions between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
located in Asia and the Middle East from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal
eﬀects (mean eﬀects), while z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear .00597 .00420 .00395 .00565 .00358
(2.24)∗∗ (1.62) (1.36) (2.17)∗∗ (1.24)
Growth -.00907
(-1.67)∗
Lawenforcement .1107
(1.87)∗
Bankregulation -.0924
(-2.40)∗∗
Marketstructure .0689
(1.28)
Propertyrights .0650
(2.40)∗∗
Entrepreneurship -.0594 -.1589 -.0681 -.1069 -.0451
(-1.29) (-2.47)∗∗ (-1.25) (-1.81)∗ (-0.84)
Fundcountry -.2470 -.1054 -.2236 -.1999 -.2257
(-6.07)∗∗∗ (-1.56) (-5.36)∗∗∗ (-3.46)∗∗∗ (-4.79)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc -.0176 .0460 -.0326 -.0021 .0181
(-0.36) (0.88) (-0.69) (-0.04) (0.35)
Corporatevc -.1790 -.1598 -.1777 -.1863 -.1844
(-3.03)∗∗∗ (-2.79)∗∗∗ (-3.07)∗∗∗ (-3.46)∗∗∗ (-3.26)∗∗∗
Commbankaﬀvc -.0795 -.0473 -.0536 -.0699 -.0178
(-1.00) (-0.61) (-0.68) (-0.89) (-0.22)
Govtaﬀvc -.2191 -.2061 -.2835 -.2170 -.2698
(-4.32)∗∗∗ (-4.41)∗∗∗ (-5.70)∗∗∗ (-4.47)∗∗∗ (-5.08)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.1321 0.1303 0.1674 0.1263 0.1674
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 732 696 690 746 690
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
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Table VI: Concentration in later stage technology intensive ventures
The probit model estimated is
Latertechfm = β0 + β1growth+ β2Lawenforcement+ β3Bankregulation
+ β4Marketstructure+ β5Propertyrights+ β6Firmyear
+ β7Firmtype+ β8Entrepreneurship+ β9Fundcountry
+β10Firstyear + ².
Latertechfm is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital fund’s investments are
concentrated in later stage technology intensive ventures. Growth is the growth rate of
GDP; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement across countries;
Bankregulation is the extent to which commercial banks are precluded from holding the equ-
ity of non-financial firms; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP;
Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries;
Firmyear is the year a venture firm was founded; Firmtype is a venture capital firm’s organi-
zational form (IV C, Invbankaffvc, Corporatevc, Commbankaffvc, and Govtaffvc);
Entrepreneurship is a ranking of the propensity for entrepreneurship across countries;
Fundcountry is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in an
emerging country; Firstyear is the year a portfolio company received its first round of venture
capital financing. Data on venture capital transactions are obtained from VentureXpert and
consist of 4,200 funding transactions between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs located
in Asia and the Middle East from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects
(mean eﬀects), while z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear .00336 .00370 .00450 .00359 .00402
(1.65)∗ (1.67)∗ (2.21)∗∗ (1.69)∗ (2.06)∗∗
Growth .00148
(0.44)
Lawenforcement .0436
(0.89)
Bankregulation .0183
(0.69)
Marketstructure .0656
(1.80)∗
Propertyrights .0392
(2.15)∗∗
Entrepreneurship .0454 -.0121 .0451 .0135 .0346
(1.12) (-0.25) (0.81) (0.30) (0.68)
Fundcountry -.1472 -.0676 -.1742 -.0815 -.1459
(-4.31)∗∗∗ (-1.26) (-4.78)∗∗∗ (-1.84)∗ (-4.35)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc .0596 .0473 .0859 .0626 .1176
(1.31) (1.03) (1.97)∗∗ (1.40) (2.49)∗∗
Corporatevc -.0217 -.0354 -.00589 -.0303 -.00457
(-0.57) (-0.93) (-0.16) (-0.80) (-0.12)
Commbankaﬀvc .2411 .2273 .2406 .2439 .2560
(3.53)∗∗∗ (3.22)∗∗∗ (3.43)∗∗∗ (3.55)∗∗∗ (3.62)∗∗∗
Govtaﬀvc -.2021 -.1944 -.2452 -.2042 -.2420
(-4.86)∗∗∗ (-4.75)∗∗∗ (-5.62)∗∗∗ (-4.92)∗∗∗ (-5.47)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.0506 0.0462 0.0743 0.0544 0.0770
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 1725 1663 1563 1735 1563
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively
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Table VIIA: Switching regression model with endogenous switching: the switch equation
Tests are implemented using a switching regression model with endogenous switching that generates
White robust t-statistics. A switching regression model consists of a main equation and a switch equ-
ation. This table reports the results for the switch equation of a switching regression model. The main
equation of the switching regression model is specified as follows (variables are described in Table VIIC).
nonhitechqt = α0 + α1age+ α2early + α3markettobook + α4tangibleassets
+ α5public+ α6onetime+ α7firstyear + α8gdppercapita
+ α9firmyear + α10capital + α11firmtype+ υ.
The switch equations for which test results are reported in this table are specified as follows
Gdppercapita = ω0 + ω1Law + ω2Growth+ ²1.
Bankregulation = µ0 + µ1Law + µ2Growth+ ²2.
Gdppercapita is GDP Per Capita; Bankregulation is the extent to which banks are precluded from holding
the equity of non-financial firms; Law is a ranking of the quality of the law and order environment across
countries; while Growth is annual GDP growth. The switch equation represents some initial guess of the
partition in a mixture data. The switching regression model generates two component regressions as
well as the probability that a particular observation is included in the first component regression. The
two component regressions obtained from the switching regression model are reported in Table VIIC.
Switching regression models with endogenous switching are discussed in Maddala (1983). Data on
venture capital transactions are obtained from VentureXpert and consist of 4,200 funding transactions
between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists located in Asia and the Middle East from 1982 to 2003.
Detailed descriptions of the variables are provided in Tables AI through AIII of the Appendix.
Panel A: The switch equation regression output
Switch Variable
Gdppercapita Bankregulation
Law -1.2003 1.1555
(-266.70)∗∗∗ (246.37)∗∗∗
Growth .0796 -.0818
(54.95)∗∗∗ (-53.95)∗∗∗
R-squared 0.9788 0.9766
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Panel B: Probability distribution for being included in the first component regression
Percentiles Probabilities Probabilities
5% .005426 .040843
10% .006440 .058031
25% .009751 .443513
50% .5398 .443513
75% .5398 .9877
90% .9464 .9913
95% .9621 .9926
Mean .3977 .5869
Variance .1009 .1038
Skewness .1222 -.0161
Kurtosis 1.9216 1.8342
∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 1% significance level
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Table VIIB: Switching regression-generated assignment of country observations
This table lists the probability that an observation drawn from a sample country
is incorporated into the first component regression generated by a switching
regression model with endogenous switching. A switching regression model
consists of a main equation and a switch equation. The main equation of the
switching regression model is specified as follows (results for the main equation
are reported in Table VIIC).
nonhitechqt = α0 + α1age+ α2early + α3markettobook
+ α4tangibleassets+ α5public+ α6onetime
+ α7firstyear + α8gdppercapita+ α9firmyear
+ α10capital + α11firmtype+ υ.
The switch equations for which test results are reported in Table VIIA are specified
as follows
Gdppercapita = ω0 + ω1Law + ω2Growth+ ²1.
Bankregulation = µ0 + µ1Law + µ2Growth+ ²2.
The switching regression model generates two component regressions from a
mixture data as well as the probability that an observation is included in the first
component regression. A probability higher than the mean probability indicates
that an observation is more likely to have been included in the first component
regression. Consequently, if the mean probability for a sample country is greater
than the overall mean probability, this indicates that observations from that
country are more likely to have been utilized in the first component regression
generated by the switching regression model. Switching regression models are
discussed in Maddala (1983). Data on venture capital transactions are obtained
from VentureXpert and consist of 4,200 funding transactions between venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs located in Asia and the Middle East from
1982 to 2003. Detailed descriptions of the variables are provided in Tables AI
through A3 of the Appendix.
Company Switch variable
Nation gdppercapita bankregulation
Mean Probabililty 0.4110 0.5727
Australia .0074 .9900
Hong Kong .3278 .6531
Japan .0216 .9734
New Zealand .0069 .9906
Singapore .1281 .8534
Taiwan .1482 .8351
China .5626 .4228
India .9656 .0469
Indonesia .8245 .1772
Israel 5219 .4723
Korea .5334 .4502
Malaysia .7084 .2865
Philippines .9592 .0451
Thailand .4491 .5359
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Table VIIC: Switching regression: The main equation
Tests are implemented using a switching regression model. The switching regression generates two component
regressions from a mixture data based on some initial guess of a partition in the data (the switch equation). The
output from the switch equations are reported in Table VIIA Table VIIB reports the country averages for the pro-
bability that an observation is included in the first component regression. Specifications (1) and (3) are first com-
ponent regressions, while specifications (2) and (4) are second component regressions. The country averages
indicate that observations from sample emerging countries are utilized in specifications (1) and (4), while observa-
tions from sample developed countries are utilized in specifications (2) and (3). The two component regressions
are generated from the following equation referred to as the main equation:
Nonhitechqt = α0 + α1Age+ α2Early + α3Markettobook + α4Tangibleassets+ α5Public
+ α6Onetime+ α7Firstyear + α8Gdppercapita+ α9Firmyear
+ α10Capital + α11Firmtype+ υ.
Nonhitechqt are the three terciles of concentration in non-technology intensive ventures. Age is the age of a port-
folio company when it received financing; Early is an indicator variable equal to one if financing was received dur-
ing the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle; Markettobook are industry market-to-book ratios; Tangibleassets are
industry ratios of tangible assets to total assets; Public is an indicator variable equal to one if a portfolio company
went public; Onetime is an indicator variable equal to one if a financing relationship consists of only one round of
financing; Firstyear is the year a firm first received venture financing; Gdppercapita is GDP per capita; Firmyear
is the year a venture capital firm commenced operations; Capital is a venture firm’s capital under management in
millions of dollars; Firmtype is a venture capital firm’s organizational structure. Data on venture capital transac-
tions are obtained from VentureXpert and consist of 4,200 funding transactions between venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs located in Asia and the Middle East from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients for four variables of minor inte-
rest included as control variables as well as the constant are not reported but are available upon request from the
author.
Independent Switch Variable: Gdppercapita Switch Variable: Bankregulation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age .00187 .0178 .0192 -.00084
(0.40) (6.43)∗∗∗ (6.84)∗∗∗ (-0.16)
Early .0938 -.3584 -.3820 .0885
(2.40)∗∗ (-8.75)∗∗∗ (-9.10)∗∗∗ (2.21)∗∗
Gdppercapita -.3775 .1270
(-14.46)∗∗∗ (7.74)∗∗∗
Bankregulation -.1429 .4059
(-8.43)∗∗∗ (14.73)∗∗∗
Firmyear -.0532 -.0118 -.0130 -.0532
(-17.15)∗∗∗ (-3.41)∗∗∗ (-3.78)∗∗∗ (-16.87)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc .1839 .2319 .2399 .1556
(3.08)∗∗∗ (3.51)∗∗∗ (3.60)∗∗∗ (2.64)∗∗
Corporatevc .1555 .00540 .0885 .1455
(2.67)∗∗∗ (0.07) (1.22) (2.44)∗∗
Commbankaﬀvc .0178 .2173 .2100 .0170
(0.36) (3.72)∗∗∗ (3.51)∗∗∗ (0.34)
Govtaﬀvc -.8570 -.1490 -.1429 -.8454
(-10.17)∗∗∗ (-1.90)∗ (-1.78)∗ (-9.57)∗∗∗
Capital -.00123 .000140 .000117 -.00113
(-9.01)∗∗∗ (4.12)∗∗∗ (3.40)∗∗∗ (-8.17)∗∗∗
R-squared 0.4834 0.2319 0.2475 0.4856
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively
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Table VIII: Concentration in early stage non-technology intensive ventures: robustness test
The probit model estimated is
Earlynontechfm = β0 + β1growth+ β2Lawenforcement+ β3Bankregulation
+ β4Marketstructure+ β5Propertyrights+ β6Firmyear
+β7Firmtype+ β8Entrepreneurship+ β10Firstyear + ².
Earlynontechfm is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital fund’s investments are
concentrated in early stage non-technology intensive ventures. Growth is the growth rate of
GDP; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement across countries;
Bankregulation is the extent to which commercial banks are precluded from holding the equity
of non-financial firms; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP;
Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries; Firmyear
is the year a venture firm was founded; Firmtype is a venture capital firm’s organizational form
(IV C, Invbankaffvc, Corporatevc, and Commbankaffvc); Entrepreneurship is a ranking
of the propensity for entrepreneurship/innovation across countries; Firstyear is the year a port
foliocompany received its first round of venture capital financing. Data on venture capital tran-
sactions are obtained from VentureXpert and consist of 2,532 funding transactions between
venture capitalists located primarily in the U.S. and the U.K. and entrepreneurs located in Asia
and the Middle East from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects (mean
eﬀects), while z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear -.00323 -.00528 -.00408 -.00453 -.00451
(-2.82)∗∗∗ (-3.32)∗∗∗ (-2.22)∗∗ (-3.56)∗∗∗ (-2.28)∗∗
Growth .0382
(2.99)∗∗∗
Lawenforcement -.1681
(-2.47)∗∗∗
Bankregulation .0692
(0.84)
Marketstructure -.0472
(-0.67)
Propertyrights -.1505
(-2.36)∗∗
Entrepreneurship -.1354 -.1492 -.0274 -.1072 -.1258
(-2.19)∗∗ (-2.30)∗∗ (-0.28) (-1.76)∗ (-1.50)
Invbankaﬀvc -.2454 -.3060 -.3339 -.2858 -.3295
(-3.35)∗∗∗ (-3.18)∗∗∗ (-3.62)∗∗∗ (-3.46)∗∗∗ (-3.47)∗∗∗
Corporatevc .8296 .8054 .7479 .7975 .7537
(6.21)∗∗∗ (6.07)∗∗∗ (5.31)∗∗∗ (5.73)∗∗∗ (4.60)∗∗∗
Commbankaﬀvc .6352 .7495 .5546 .5483 .5279
(2.91)∗∗∗ (4.61)∗∗∗ (2.21)∗∗ (2.49)∗∗ (2.58)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.3439 0.3355 0.2845 0.2997 0.3051
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 392 350 334 394 334
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively
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Chapter II
Is the quality of property rights
protection a risk factor?
Ueda (2004) develops a model, which predicts that entrepreneurs in poor qual-
ity property rights environments will be less likely to obtain financing from
venture capitalists due to the risk of expropriation by the venture capital-
ist. Claessens and Laeven (2003) find that intangible asset intensive indus-
tries grow faster in better quality property rights environments. Claessens
and Laeven interpret this finding as evidence for unwillingness to invest or
sub-optimal demand for external financing in poor quality property rights en-
vironments because of the risk of expropriation from other economic agents.
In line with this postulation, Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruﬀ (2002) find
that entrepreneurs in countries where expropriation by the government is more
likely are unwilling to invest even when external financing is readily available.
The predictions in Ueda (2004) and Claessens and Laeven (2003) as well as
the empirical results in Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruﬀ (2002) characterize
the quality of property rights protection as a risk factor. If this is the case,
it is expected that this will aﬀect investors’ portfolio decisions in poor quality
property rights environments. That is, investors in poor quality property
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rights environments will be more likely to hold diversified portfolios relative
to investors in better quality property rights environments in an attempt to
diversify away the idiosyncratic component of expropriation risk since they are
not compensated for exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
In this study, I examine whether poor quality legal environments (poor
quality contract enforcement and property rights protection) are considered
risk factors by venture capitalists operating in these environments. I hypoth-
esize that venture capitalists located in poor quality legal environments will
be more likely to hold diversified or balanced portfolios relative to venture
capitalists located in better quality legal environments if the quality of legal
environment is considered a risk factor. That is, the propensity to hold di-
versified portfolios (portfolios diversified across industries or across firm life
cycles) will decrease with the quality of the legal environment.
However, a greater propensity to hold diversified portfolios in poor quality
property rights environments may also be evidence for higher levels of risk
aversion in poor quality property rights environments. Hence, in order to
exclude this interpretation of empirical results, it is necessary to hold the level
of risk aversion constant in both poor and better quality legal environments.
This purpose is also served if investors can be shown to be risk neutral.
Evidence that this is the case for venture capitalists is provided in Lerner and
Schoar (2004) and Obrimah (2005).
Lerner and Schoar (2004) find that venture capitalists in poor quality legal
environments take larger equity positions in their portfolio companies rela-
tive to venture capitalists in better quality legal environments. Furthermore,
venture capitalists in poor quality legal environments are more likely to use
straight or common equity (lower priority instrument), while venture capital-
ists in better quality legal environments are more likely to use convertible debt
instruments (higher priority instrument prior to vesting). Obrimah (2005),
on the other hand, finds that venture capitalists in poor quality legal environ-
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ments have a greater propensity to concentrate investments in low collateral,
high growth, and high risk ventures relative to venture capitalists in better
quality legal environments. These empirical results indicate that venture
capitalists in poor quality legal environments are not characterized by risk
aversion relative to venture capitalists in better quality legal environments.
I find that venture capitalists’ propensity to hold diversified portfolios de-
creases with the quality of contract enforcement, indicating that the qual-
ity of contract enforcement is a risk factor. Venture capitalists’ propensity
to hold diversified portfolios also decreases with the extent to which capi-
tal markets are market based, and the propensity for entrepreneurship across
countries. This indicates that the demand for venture capital financing is
greater in market-based economies relative to bank-based economies as pos-
tulated in Black and Gilson (1998). This also indicates that the demand for
venture capital financing is greater in countries with a higher propensity for
entrepreneurship.
I find, however, that the propensity to hold diversified portfolios increases
with the quality of property rights protection. This indicates that the quality
of property rights protection is not a risk factor. Rather, the results sug-
gest that the demand for venture capital financing is greater in poor quality
property rights environments. If the demand for venture capital financing is
greater in poor quality property rights environments, this implies that venture
capitalists in poor quality property rights environments will have a greater
propensity to hold concentrated portfolios relative to venture capitalists in
better quality legal environments. This is the argument in Obrimah (2005).
I find that venture capitalists in poor quality property rights environments
are more likely to hold concentrated portfolios in three of the four classes of
firms considered. This indicates that the demand for venture capital financ-
ing is greater in poor quality property rights environments relative to better
quality property rights environments. Overall, the results characterize the
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quality of property rights protection as a demand variable rather than a risk
factor. One interpretation of these results is that poor quality property rights
protection hinders financing transactions in informal capital markets. Con-
sequently, when a financial intermediary that is willing to bear risk (venture
capitalists) emerges simultaneously in poor and better quality property rights
environments, the demand for the financial intermediaries’ services is greater
in poor quality legal environments.
If this interpretation of the results is valid, it is expected that the results
will be less likely to hold for relatively large firms since these firms’ financing
needs are less likely to be met in informal capital markets. I find that this is the
case. The demand for venture capital financing from relatively large firms is
greater in better quality property rights environments. This is consistent with
the findings in Obrimah (2005), which finds that small firms in poor quality
legal environments are more financially constrained relative to small firms
in better quality legal environments; while large firms in poor quality legal
environments are less financially constrained relative to large firms in better
quality legal environments. The empirical results in this paper are consistent
with the conclusion in Obrimah (2005) that poor quality legal environments
primarily aﬀect the development of informal capital markets.
These results do not support the Ueda (2004) and Claessens and Laeven
(2003) hypothesis that the quality of property rights protection is a risk fac-
tor, which adversely aﬀects entrepreneurs’ willingness to invest. Rather, the
results indicate that the need for financial intermediation is greater in poor
quality property rights environments. Hence, encouraging the growth of ven-
ture capital financing, which is better suited to ameliorating moral hazard
problems (investments in small firms and technology intensive ventures) rela-
tive to bank or debt financing, will facilitate faster economic growth in poor
quality property rights environments. The relatively greater need for financial
intermediation during the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle may also ex-
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plain why capital markets in poor quality legal environments are bank-based
rather than market-based.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The analytical framework
is discussed in Section I. Section II describes the data. Empirical results,
including robustness results are reported in Section III. Section IV concludes.
I Analytical Framework
A risk factor, fi is made up of a non-diversifiable or market risk component,
fmi, and an idiosyncratic or diversifiable risk component fdi, which is partic-
ular to diﬀerent classes of firms. As the severity of a risk factor increases
across countries, both the idiosyncratic and market risk components of the
risk factor are increasing. An increase in the market risk component of the
risk factor leads to higher prices (required rates of return), while an increase
in the idiosyncratic component increases the incentive to hold portfolios that
diversify away the idiosyncratic component of the risk factor.
However, an increase in the propensity to hold diversified portfolios may
also indicate that investors in poor quality legal environments are more risk
averse relative to investors in better quality legal environments. Consequently,
in order to exclude this interpretation of empirical results, it is necessary to
show that investors in poor quality legal environments are not characterized
by a higher levels of risk aversion relative to investors in better quality legal
environments.
Venture capitalists’ asset allocation decisions across countries provide an
opportunity to hold risk aversion constant, while examining whether the qual-
ity of the legal environment (contract enforcement and property rights protec-
tion) are risk factors. First, venture capitalists hold riskier equity positions
as the risk of their portfolio companies increase, hence, of necessity they must
be risk neutral (see Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1997)). Evidence that venture
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capitalists in poor quality legal environments are not characterized by risk
aversion relative to venture capitalists in better quality legal environments is
provided in Lerner and Schoar (2004) and Obrimah (2005).
Lerner and Schoar (2004) find that venture capitalists in poor quality legal
environments take larger equity positions in their portfolio companies rela-
tive to venture capitalists in better quality legal environments. Furthermore,
venture capitalists in poor quality legal environments are more likely to use
straight or common equity (lower priority instrument), while venture capital-
ists in better quality legal environments are more likely to use convertible debt
instruments (higher priority instrument prior to vesting). Obrimah (2005),
on the other hand, finds that venture capitalists in poor quality legal environ-
ments have a greater propensity to concentrate investments in low collateral,
high growth, and high risk ventures relative to venture capitalists in better
quality legal environments. This is evidence that venture capitalists in poor
quality legal environments are not characterized by risk aversion relative to
venture capitalists in better quality legal environments.
Macroeconomic variables such as the extent to which capital markets are
market-based are also expected to aﬀect the demand for venture capital fi-
nancing, and consequently, venture capitalists’ propensity to hold diversified
portfolios. Black and Gilson (1998) predict that market-based capital mar-
kets are better able to support venture capital financing. In market-based
economies, the incentive of an IPO exit for the entrepreneur, which creates
a liquid asset increases the demand for venture capital funds, which in turn
leads to a greater supply of venture capital funds and a higher level of venture
capital activity. Lower demand for venture capital financing in bank-based
capital markets relative to market-based capital markets implies that venture
capitalists in bank-based economies will be more likely to hold diversified port-
folios because the lower level of demand is less able to support concentrated
portfolios.
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Given that we can hold venture capitalists’ attitudes towards risk constant,
a decrease in the propensity to hold diversified portfolios with the quality of
the legal environment is evidence that the quality of legal environment vari-
ables (contract enforcement and property rights protection) are risk factors.
Venture capitalists’ portfolios can be diversified across broad industry group-
ings, and life cycle stages at financing. The industry classifications are two
- technology intensive, and non-technology intensive ventures; while the life
cycle stage classifications are two - early stage and later or expansion stage
ventures. Expropriation risk is relatively high for technology intensive, and
early stage ventures, while it is relatively low for non-technology intensive and
later stage ventures. Appendix A, (Tables AII, and AIII) details the specific
classes that make up these broad groupings.
Venture capitalists that hold diversified portfolios are determined as fol-
lows. For each venture capital fund represented in the sample, I determine
total dollar disbursements to all companies in its portfolio as well as propor-
tions of the total disbursed to non-technology intensive ventures. I divide
the venture capital funds into three terciles based on the proportions of their
investments in non-technology intensive ventures, and venture capital funds
located in the third tercile are deemed to be ‘concentrated’ in non-technology
intensive ventures. Venture capital funds located in the second or middle
tercile, on the other hand, are deemed to be ‘mildly concentrated’ in non-
technology intensive ventures. Mildly concentrated venture capital funds are
also deemed to hold diversified portfolios. Venture capitalists whose portfolios
are mildly concentrated in technology intensive, early stage, and later stage
ventures are similarly determined.
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A Propensity to hold diversified portfolios
Hypothesis 3 The propensity to hold diversified portfolios (that is, the propen-
sity to hold mildly concentrated portfolios) decreases with the quality of the le-
gal environment, the propensity for entrepreneurship, and the extent to which
capital markets are market based.
The dependent variables are the three terciles of portfolio concentration in
a particular portfolio item, such as non-technology intensive ventures. The
tests are implemented using a multinomial logit model that utilizes venture
capitalists located in the first tercile of portfolio concentration as the compar-
ison group. Venture capital funds located in the middle tercile are deemed
to hold diversified portfolios. The test specifications are as follows (stated
for non-technology intensive and early stage ventures and similarly defined for
other portfolio items):
Nonhitechqti = β0 + β1Earlyj,c + β2Lawenforcementj,c
+ β3Entrepreneurshipj,c + β4Marketstructurej,c
+ β5Propertyrightsj,c + β6Firmyeari + β7Fundcountryi
+ β8Firmtypei + β9Firstyearj + ²i (II.1)
Earlyqti = α0 + α1Nonhitechj,c + α2Lawenforcementj,c
+ α3Entrepreneurshipj,c + α4Marketstructurej,c
+ α5Propertyrightsj,c + α6Firmyeari + α7Fundcountryi
+ α8Firmtypei + α9Firstyearj + ²i (II.2)
where Nonhitechqti and Earlyqti are the three terciles of portfolio con-
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centration in non-technology intensive and early stage ventures, respectively.
The subscript c refers to the portfolio company’s country of location, while the
subscript j refers to the company receiving financing. All variables utilized in
the empirical tests are described in Appendix A, Table AI, which lists all vari-
ables, describes them, and explains how they are constructed or the source as
appropriate. Following, I motivate the independent variables (excluding the
quality of contract enforcement (Lawenforcement), the quality of property
rights protection (Propertyrights), and the extent to which capital markets
are market-based (Marketstructure).
Portfolio company characteristics Obrimah (2005b) finds that the de-
mand for initial rounds of venture capital financing from early stage ventures
in poor quality legal environments is high, while corresponding demand from
later stage ventures is low. Low demand for external financing, coupled with
higher risk in poor quality legal environments is expected to increase venture
capitalists’ propensity to hold diversified portfolios. Given these findings, I
include investment stage and industry variables as independent variables in
the empirical tests where applicable. The two variables included in the anal-
yses are an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is in the early stages of
a firm’s growth cycle; and an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is a
non-technology intensive venture.
The demand for venture capital financing The propensity for entrepreneur-
ship across countries is expected to aﬀect the demand for venture capital fi-
nancing. The demand for venture capital financing is expected to be higher in
countries where economic agents possess a greater propensity for entrepreneur-
ship. This implies that venture capitalists in higher propensity for entrepreneur-
ship countries will be less likely to hold diversified portfolios. The two vari-
ables considered, one for the propensity to take risks and the other for the
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propensity to innovate have a correlation of 0.83. Both variables have the
same eﬀect when included in the analysis, but only results with the propensity
for entrepreneurship/innovation are reported. These are continuous variables.
Location of venture capital fund The variable fundcountry is an indi-
cator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in an emerging
country (equivalently, poor quality legal environment). A positive regression
coeﬃcient (β9) on this variable indicates that venture capitalists in poor qual-
ity legal environments have a greater propensity to concentrate investments
in j-type firms relative to venture capitalists in better quality legal environ-
ments. Hence, this variable indicates whether economic profits that accrue
to venture capitalists are greater in poor quality legal environments relative
to better quality legal environments. If the coeﬃcient of fundcountry is
significant with the expected sign (positive), while the quality of legal envi-
ronment variables are not, this suggests that economic profits in poor quality
legal environments are also driven by venture capitalists’ ability to earn risk
premiums.
Venture capital fund related variables Venture capital firm specific
variables are included as independent variables in the tests implemented.
firmtype is the organizational form of a venture capital firm, which has
been shown to contain information about venture capitalists’ risk preferences
(Obrimah (2004), Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri (2003)). Appendix A (Table
AIII) reports the classification of venture capitalists according to organiza-
tional form. firmyear is the year in which a venture capital firm commenced
operations. This variable is included in the empirical tests because it is ex-
pected that venture capitalists’ asset allocations are aﬀected by how long they
have been in business. firstyear is a dummy variable for the year in which a
financing relationship commenced. This variable accounts for possible changes
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in venture capitalists’ investment opportunity sets over time.
Venture capital firm reputation The number of deals a venture capitalist
has participated in is utilized as a weight in the tests implemented. This is
based on the following argument. Suppose at time t = 0, there exist four
VCs (vca, vcb, vcc, and vcd), one of which (vca) is concentrated in technology
intensive ventures, while the others are not. Assume that at time t = 1,
the demand for venture capital financing from technology intensive ventures
increases significantly. Given that reputation is important in the venture
capital market,12 vca attracts a significant chunk of the increased demand,
but due to risk considerations is only able to soak up half of the increased
demand. vcb, on the other hand, is able to soak up more of the residual
demand (35 percent) relative to vcc, and vcd, and ends up being classified as
a concentrated VC at time t = 1.
If vca, and vcb are given equal weight in the analysis at t = 1, vcb’s
importance is overstated, while vca’s importance is understated. Hence, in
order to capture the demand and risk dynamics, which are central to the
analysis, it is important to base the analysis on deal level data, which captures
the relative importance of vca, and vcb. The same argument applies to the
country variables. If the demand for venture capital financing is higher in
better quality property rights environments, then it is expected that there
will be more financing transactions in these countries, and this ought to be
reflected in the analysis.
II Venture capital data
Venture capital markets in the sample countries are emerging markets that
for the most part, developed concurrently and experienced significant growth
starting in the late 1990s. Hence, diﬀerences in venture capitalists’ asset allo-
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cation decisions cannot be attributed to diﬀerences in the relative maturities of
the venture capital markets in these countries. Furthermore, venture capital
markets in the sample emerging and developed countries are not segmented.
In fact, venture capitalists in some developed countries (Singapore and Hong
Kong in particular) raise venture capital funds for investments in the sample
emerging countries.13
Data on venture capital transactions are obtained from VentureXpert,
which is owned by Ventureeconomics. The cross-country data set consists
of 6,552 distinct venture capital investments during 4,264 distinct rounds of
venture financing. Venture capital firms located in the sample countries are
responsible for 67 percent of all sample transactions (4,200 observations), while
venture capitalists located primarily in the U.S. and the U.K. are responsible
for 33 percent of all sample transactions (2,352 observations).
These investments involve 2,857 portfolio companies located in Asia and
Israel that received their first round of funding from venture capitalists (VCs)
between 1982 and December 2000. The developed countries based on World
Bank classifications are: Australia, Hong Kong (China), New Zealand, Japan
and Singapore; while the emerging countries are: China, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Malaysia, Philippines, Korea, Republic, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.
This sample is obtained from a total database of 10,192 venture capital
and private equity transactions. From this total sample, I eliminate:
1. All buyout transactions, since these are not standard venture capital
transactions (1,042 observations);
2. All venture capital relationships that did not commence prior to De-
cember 31, 2000 (1,815 observations); this ensures that I have at least
two-and-a-half years of data on each financing relationship;
3. All investments in the financial services industry (180 observations); as
well as any observation that does not specify the dollar value of each
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round investment; the investment stage; the industry; and the name of
the portfolio company (603 observations).
This process resulted in the elimination of 3,640 data records. These in-
vestments involve 818 venture capital firms with 465 or 57 percent of these
venture capital firms located in the sample countries.14 Table I reports indus-
try and investment stage statistics by sample country for this data set. The
statistics reported in Table I indicate that technology intensive deals outnum-
ber non-technology intensive deals in practically all of the sample countries
regardless of the location of the venture capitalists providing financing. Also,
later stage deals outnumber early stage financing deals across all sample coun-
tries regardless of the location of the venture capitalists providing financing.
Panels A and B of Table II show that venture capitalists in poor quality
legal environments invest smaller amounts in a larger number of firms relative
to venture capitalists in better quality legal environments. On average, the
number of firms in emerging country-based venture capitalists’ portfolios is
2x the number of firms in developed country-based venture capitalists’ port-
folios. The amount disbursed by emerging country-based venture capitalists
to a single firm are about 0.2x to 0.33x the amounts disbursed by developed
country-based venture capitalists. This is consistent with test-of-means statis-
tics reported in Panel C of Table II, which indicate that average capital under
management for emerging country-based venture capital firms is about 0.38x
average capital under management for developed country-based venture capi-
tal firms. These means are significantly diﬀerent at the 5 percent confidence
level.
About thirty percent of portfolio companies are non-technology intensive
companies in the cross-country sample. This proportion is very similar to
that reported in Obrimah (2004) for VCs in the U.S. Total funding com-
mitted to all sample companies amounts to $1.56 billion, with 31 percent (61
57
percent) being disbursed to non-technology intensive (respectively, technology
intensive) ventures.
Forty-three percent of sample portfolio companies are early stage ventures
at the first round of venture financing. Early stage ventures constitute a
significant minority amongst non-technology intensive ventures (32 percent),
a slight minority amongst technology intensive ventures (47 percent) and a
significant majority amongst medical/health-related ventures (60 percent). A
total of $780 million was disbursed to portfolio companies receiving their first
round of venture capital financing and 31 percent of this total went to early
stage ventures.
Syndication is not very prevalent within this sample. Deals involving
syndications between the diﬀerent classes of VCs are also very few. The
percentage of deals involving independent private partnerships and at least one
other venture capital class range from 8 percent for commercial bank aﬃliated
VCs, to 16 percent for investment bank aﬃliated VCs. Syndication with
other classes of VCs, other than independent private partnerships is even less
prevalent. The proportion of deals involving a single class of VCs ranges from
79 percent for investment bank aﬃliated VCs, to 91 percent for independent
private partnerships. This lack of extensive syndication may be rational in
markets that are far from perfect, since information rents are likely to exist in
such markets.15
III Results and interpretations
Empirical results reported in Table III indicate that the propensity to mildly
concentrate investments in technology intensive ventures decreases with the
quality of contract enforcement and the extent to which capital markets are
market based in line with expectations. However, the propensity to mildly
concentrate investments in technology intensive ventures increases with the
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quality of property rights protection.
These results are economically significant. Venture capitalists in poor
quality contract enforcement environments are 15 percent more likely to hold
diversified portfolios, while those in poor quality property rights protection
environments are 10 percent less likely to hold diversified portfolios. These re-
sults indicate that the quality of contract enforcement is a risk factor, while the
quality of property rights protection is not. The results also support the pre-
diction in Black and Gilson (1998), that the demand for venture capital financ-
ing is greater in market-based economies relative to bank-based economies.
A Non-technology intensive ventures
Table IV reports empirical results for the propensity to mildly concentrate
investments in non-technology intensive ventures. The results indicate that
the propensity to mildly concentrate investments in non-technology intensive
ventures decreases with the quality of contract enforcement and the extent to
which capital markets are market based. However, the propensity to mildly
concentrate investments in non-technology intensive ventures increases with
the quality of property rights protection.
These results are economically significant. Venture capitalists in poor
quality contract enforcement environments are 19 percent more likely to hold
diversified portfolios, while venture capitalists in poor quality property rights
protection environments are 11 percent less likely to hold diversified portfolios.
These results indicate that the quality of contract enforcement is a risk factor,
while the quality of property rights protection is not. The results also sup-
port the prediction in Black and Gilson (1998), that the demand for venture
capital financing is greater in market-based economies relative to bank-based
economies.
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B Early stage ventures
Test results reported in Table V indicate that the propensity to mildly concen-
trate investments in early stage ventures decreases with the quality of contract
enforcement and the extent to which capital markets are market based. How-
ever, the propensity to mildly concentrate investments in early stage ventures
increases with the quality of property rights protection. These results indicate
that the quality of contract enforcement is a risk factor, while the quality of
property rights protection is not. The results also indicate that the demand
for venture capital financing is greater in market-based capital markets relative
to bank-based capital markets.
C Later stage ventures
Table VI reports test results for the propensity to mildly concentrate invest-
ments in later stage ventures. The results are qualitatively similar to those
reported in Table IV for the propensity to mildly concentrate investments in
early stage ventures. Hence, the results indicate that the quality of contract
enforcement is a risk factor, while the quality of property rights protection is
not. These results are economically significant. Venture capitalists in poor
quality contract enforcement environments are about 13 percent more likely
to hold diversified portfolios, while those in more market-based economies are
22 percent more likely to hold diversified portfolios.
I also find that the propensity to hold diversified portfolios consisting of
later stage ventures decreases with the propensity for entrepreneurship or risk
taking across countries. This indicates that the demand for venture capi-
tal financing from later stage ventures is greater in countries with a higher
propensity for entrepreneurship. That is, entrepreneurs that own mature
ventures are more likely to invest if they are located in a high propensity
for entrepreneurship country relative to a low propensity for entrepreneurship
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country. This finding possesses implications for studies that compare firm
growth rates across countries given that these studies are usually based on
older, more mature firms (later stage firms) that are publicly quoted.
D Interpretation of Results and Robustness Tests
The results obtained in the preceding subsections indicate that the quality of
property rights protection is not a risk factor. The results suggest that the
quality of property rights protection primarily aﬀects the demand for venture
capital financing. Two possibilities arise. If the results indicate that the
demand for venture capital financing is greater in better quality property rights
environments, then it is expected that the propensity to hold concentrated
portfolios will be greater in better quality legal environments. On the other
hand, if the results indicate that the demand for venture capital financing
is greater in poor quality legal environments, then the propensity to hold
concentrated portfolios will be greater in poor quality legal environments.
Table VII reports empirical results for the propensity to concentrate invest-
ments in the four diﬀerent classes of firms considered. The results indicate
that for three out of the four classes of firms, the propensity to hold con-
centrated portfolios decreases with the quality of property rights protection.
Furthermore, this result only breaks down for concentration in later stage non-
technology intensive ventures. Ueda (2004) predicts that venture capitalists
will be more likely to invest in high growth, high risk, and low collateral value
ventures. Amongst the diﬀerent classes of firms considered in this paper, later
stage non-technology intensive ventures least conform to the characteristics of
firms that are best suited to venture capital financing per the prediction in
Ueda (2004).
Obrimah (2005) finds that venture capitalists in better quality property
rights environments have a greater propensity to invest in large firms relative
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to venture capitalists in poor quality property rights environments. Obrimah
concludes that poor quality legal environments primarily hinder the develop-
ment of informal capital markets in poor quality legal environments. The
results obtained in this paper pertaining to the quality of property rights pro-
tection are consistent with the empirical findings and conclusions in Obrimah
(2005). That is, the results indicate that the gap between the supply and
demand of external financing is greater in poor quality property rights envi-
ronments. Hence, financial development, that is, the emergence of venture
capitalists, has a greater eﬀect on small firms’ access to external financing in
poor quality property rights environments relative to small firms’ access to
external financing in better quality property rights environments.
IV Conclusions
In this paper, I find that venture capitalists’ propensity to hold diversified port-
folios decreases with the quality of contract enforcement, indicating that the
quality of contract enforcement is a risk factor. Venture capitalists’ propen-
sity to hold diversified portfolios also decreases with the extent to which capi-
tal markets are market based, and the propensity for entrepreneurship across
countries. Given that the propensity to hold diversified portfolios decreases
with the level of demand, this indicates that the demand for venture capital fi-
nancing is greater in market-based economies relative to bank-based economies
as postulated in Black and Gilson (1998). This also indicates that the de-
mand for external financing is greater in countries with a higher propensity
for entrepreneurship.
However, the propensity to hold diversified portfolios increases with the
quality of property rights protection. This finding is not consistent with a
characterization of the quality of property rights protection as a risk factor
in Ueda (2004) and Claessens and Laeven (2003). Robustness test results
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indicate that the gap between the supply and demand of external financing is
greater in poor quality property rights environments relative to better quality
property rights environments. That is, the robustness results show that ven-
ture capitalists in poor quality property rights environments have a greater
propensity to hold concentrated portfolios relative to venture capitalists in
better quality property rights environments.
Hence, the totality of the results indicate that poor quality property rights
protection hinders the development of informal capital markets, hence the
greater need for financial intermediation during the early stages of a firm’s
growth cycle. This relatively greater need for financial intermediation during
the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle is one possible explanation for why
countries characterized by poor quality legal environments tend to be bank-
based. This interpretation of the results is consistent with the conclusions in
Obrimah (2005).
The interpretation of the empirical results possesses implications for devel-
opmental policies in emerging countries and developmental policies for emerg-
ing countries by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. That is,
encouraging the growth of venture capital financing, which is better suited to
ameliorating moral hazard problems (investments in small firms and technol-
ogy intensive ventures) relative to bank or debt financing, will facilitate faster
economic growth in poor quality legal environments.
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Notes
12Gompers (1996), Obrimah (2005b).
13The Guide to Venture Capital in Asia (2000).
14We note here that discussions with Ventureeconomics indicate that the coverage of Asia
venture capital transactions in the VentureXpert database simply reflects the data that they
have been able to obtain so far and does not represent any bias on their part whatsoever.
The fact that macro characteristics of this unique data set correspond to macro data on
Asian countries and Israel obtained from the GVCA further lends credence to this assertion
15These statistics are not reported, but are available upon request from the author.
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A Data descriptions, constructions, and sources as appropriate
Table AI: Data Descriptions, and Sources
This table describes all the data utilized in our analyses. The first 11 variables are items related to
venture capital transactions and are obtained from VentureXpert. Sources are cited for all other
variables. The three terciles of concentration in a particular class of firms, j are constructed as fo-
llows. For each venture capital fund in the sample, I determine total dollar disbursements to all
portfolio companies as well as the proportion of the total disbursed to j-type firms. Venture cap-
italists are then divided into three terciles based on the proportion of their assets in j-type firms.
Symbol Description/Construction
Nonhitech Dummy variable = 1 if a portfolio company is a non-technology intensive venture.
Nonhitechqt The three terciles of concentration in non-technology intensive ventures.
Early Dummy variable = 1 if a portfolio company is in the early stages of a firm’s growth
cycle.
Earlyqt The three terciles of concentration in early stage ventures.
Laterqt The three terciles of concentration in later stage ventures.
Hitechqt The three terciles of concentration in technology intensive ventures.
Firmyear The year a venture capital firm was set up.
Invbankaffvc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is aﬃliated with an investment bank.
Corporatevc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is aﬃliated with a non-financial corp.
Commbankaffvc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is aﬃliated with a commercial bank.
Govtaffvc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is government-owned or aﬃliated.
Entrepreneurship Country ranking of entrepreneurship and innovation by the World Economic
Forum. Taken from the Global Competitiveness Report (1996). Higher rankings
imply higher innovation capabilities.
Lawenforcement∗ Measures the relative degree to which contractual agreements are enforced and co-
mplications presented by language and mentality diﬀerences. Scored 1-4, with hig-
her scores for superior quality, averaged over 1980-1989, and 1990- 995; Source:
Knack and Keefer (1995) using data from Business Environmental Risk Guide (BERG).
Propertyrights∗ Rating of property rights on a scale of 1 to 5. The more protection private property
receives, the higher the score. Source: LLSV (1998b), using data from 1997 Index of
Economic Freedom.
Marketstructure∗ Constructed as the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in any given year;
Stock market capitalizations are obtained from the Emerging Stock Markets Fact-
book, while GDP data are from the World Development Indicators (2002) database.
* descriptions obtained from Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2001).
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Table AII: Industry and investment stage classifications
This table reports the industry, and investment stage classification
schemes employed in this paper. Hitech are technologically intensi-
ve inventures; Nonhitech are non-technologically intensive ventu-
res; while Medical are medical/health-related ventures. Actual clas-
sifications are obtained from VentureXpert. Portfolio companies in the
Start-up/Seed or Early stages of a firm’s life cycle are firms that are still
in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Firms classified as early
stage firms tend to be older and further on along the firm’s life cycle
relative to those classified as Start-up/Seed firms. Porfolio companies
in the expansion or later stages of a firm’s growth cycle are relatively
established firms who need financing primarily to fund growth oppor-
tunities. These are larger and older firms relative to Early Stage and
Start-up firms. Firms classified as later stage firms tend to be further
along on a firm’s life cycle relative to those classified as expansion
stage firms.
Actual
Classifications Broad Classifications in this paper
Panel A: Industry Classifications
Hitech Nonhitech Medical
Agr/Forestry/Fish ×
Biotechnology ×
Business Services ×
Communications ×
Computer Hardware ×
Computer Other ×
Computer Software ×
Construction ×
Consumer Related ×
Industrial/Energy ×
Internet Specific ×
Manufacturing ×
Medical/Health ×
Other ×
Semiconductor/Electr. ×
Transportation ×
Utilities ×
Panel B: Classifications by Investment Stage
Later Stage Early Stage
Early Stage ×
Expansion ×
Later Stage ×
Startup/Seed ×
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Table AIII: Classification of venture capitalists by organizational structure
This table reports the ‘venture capital type’ classification scheme employed in this paper. The row
items are the actual classifications of venture capital firms by organizational structure. These classi-
fications are obtained from VentureXpert. SBIC NEC are Small Business Investment Companies
(SBICs) not classified within any of the other VentureXpert classes. Fund of funds are venture capi-
tal funds that invest in other venture capital funds rather than investing directly in firms in need of
venture capital financing. All other ‘actual’ classifications are self-explanatory. The Broad classifi-
cations in this paper are five. These are IV C (Independent Venture Capitalist; Invbankaffvc (Invest-
ment Bank aﬃliated venture capitalist); Corporatevc (Corporate venture capitalist; Commbankaffvc
(Commercial Bank aﬃliated venture capitalist); and Govtaffvc (Government aﬃliated venture capitalist).
Actual
Classifications Broad Classifications in this paper
Com-
Invba- Corpo- mban- Govt-
IVC nkaﬀvc ratevc kaﬀvc aﬀvc
Aﬃliate of Other Financial Institution ×
Bank Group ×
Business Development Fund ×
Commercial Bank Aﬃliate ×
Corporate (non-financial) Aﬃliate ×
Corporate (non-financial) Venture Program ×
Investment Management Firm ×
Investment Bank & Aﬃliates ×
Other Government Program ×
Fund of Funds ×
Independent Private Partnership ×
SBIC NEC ×
State Govt. Aﬃliated Program ×
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Table AIV: Correlations Table for the cross-country sample
This table reports correlations between independent variables utilized in this paper. The
data comes from fourteen emerging and developed countries. The developed countries
based on World Bank classifications are: Australia, Hong Kong (China), New Zealand,
Japan and Singapore; while the emerging countries are: China, India, Indonesia ,Israel,
Malaysia, Philippines, Korea, Republic, Taiwan (China) and Thailand. The data consists
of 4,200 distinct venture capital transactions between entrepreneurs and venture capita-
lists located within the sample countries. Firmyear is the year a venture capital firm com-
menced operations; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement
across countries; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP;
Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries;
Entrepreneurship is a ranking of the propensity for entrepreneurship/innovation across
countries; Fundcountry is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is
located in an emerging country; Invbankaffvc are Investment Bank aﬃliated venture
capitalists; Corporatevc are venture capitalists aﬃliated with non-financial corporations;
Commbankaffvc are Commercial Bank aﬃliated venture capitalists; Govtaffvc are gover-
nment aﬃliated venture capitalists; Early is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm
was in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle when it received its first round of fina-
ncing; Gdppercapita isannual GDP Per Capita.
Lawe- Mark- Entre- Fund-
Firm- nforc- etstru- Proper- prene- coun-
year ement cture tyrights urship try
Firmyear 1.0000
Lawenforcement 0.0425 1.0000
Marketstructure 0.0336 0.7267 1.0000
Propertyrights 0.2298 0.4990 0.2933 1.0000
Entrepreneurship 0.1021 -0.4193 -0.4199 -0.2764 1.0000
Fundcountry 0.0456 -0.7865 -0.7633 -0.3428 0.6220 1.0000
Invbankaﬀvc -0.0246 0.1518 0.1402 -0.0799 -0.0116 -0.1904
Corporatevc 0.0806 -0.0375 0.0102 0.0986 0.0168 0.0688
Commbankaﬀvc -0.1864 -0.2134 -0.1306 -0.3308 0.0842 0.1919
Govtaﬀvc -0.2620 -0.0484 -0.0499 -0.0990 -0.0634 -0.1462
Early -0.0091 -0.1197 -0.0871 -0.0954 0.0878 0.1479
Invb- Cor- Com-
anka- pora- mban Govt-
ﬀvc tevc kaﬀvc aﬀvc Early
Invbankaﬀvc 1.0000
Corporatevc -0.1250 1.0000
Commbankaﬀvc -0.1677 -0.1408 1.0000
Govtaﬀvc -0.1051 -0.0883 -0.1184 1.0000
Early -0.0999 0.0531 0.0454 0.1281 1.0000
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Table I: Summary statistics for venture capital data by country
This table reports the industry, and investment stage distribution of the venture capital data
utilized in this paper. These data are obtained from VentureXpert and consist of 6,552 venture
capital transactions between entrepreneurs located in the fourteen sample countries and (1)
venture capitalists located in these sample countries (sample VCs); and (2) venture capitalists
located primarily in the U.S. and the U.K.(‘Other VCs’). Hitech are technology intensive ven-
tures; Nonhitech are non-technology intensive ventures; and Medical are medical or health
related ventures. Early Stage firms are firms in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle, while
Later Stage firms are firms in the expansion stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Details of industries
classified as Hitech, Nonhitech or Medical as well as firms classified as early stage or later stage
firms are provided in Table AII of the Appendix.
Transactions with sample VCs Transactions with other VCs
Panel A: Data descriptions by country and industry classification
Hit- Med- Nonhi- Hit- Med- Nonhi-
Country ech ical tech ech ical tech Total
Australia 444 122 287 160 34 90 1,137
China 72 15 34 100 11 39 271
Hong Kong 84 45 143 40 312
India 389 69 319 180 8 33 998
Indonesia 12 1 18 7 18 56
Israel 187 64 8 460 135 22 876
Japan 65 10 49 91 15 140 370
Korea 1,076 138 249 213 24 36 1,736
Malaysia 24 1 12 6 2 13 58
New Zealand 30 4 21 16 9 80
Philippines 9 7 8 25 49
Singapore 106 6 26 122 16 32 308
Taiwan 139 1 36 65 1 22 264
Thailand 4 13 6 5 9 37
Total 2,644 431 1,125 1,577 251 528 6,552
Panel B: Data descriptions by country and investment stage classification
Later Early Later Early
Country Stage Stage Stage Stage Total
Australia 577 276 181 103 1,137
China 72 49 94 56 271
Hong Kong 100 29 141 42 312
India 368 409 134 87 998
Indonesia 28 3 19 6 56
Israel 156 103 352 265 876
Japan 90 34 172 74 370
Korea 817 646 146 127 1,736
Malaysia 21 16 16 5 58
New Zealand 45 10 25 80
Philippines 15 1 26 7 49
Singapore 86 52 117 53 308
Taiwan 157 19 62 26 264
Thailand 12 5 10 10 37
Total 2,547 1,653 1,495 861 6,552
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Table II: Industry- and investment stage-based test-of-means results
This table reports the results of industry and investment stage based test-of-means. The data
consists of 4,200 funding transactions between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists located
within the sample countries from 1982 to 2003. Nonhitech are non-technology intensive ven-
tures, Hitech are technology intensive ventures, while Health Related are medical/health related
ventures. Early Stage firms are firms in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Later Stage
firms are firms in the expansion stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Capital is total capital under
management by a venture capital firm (includes funds committed to venture capitalists but not
yet disbursed and investments from which venture capitalists are yet to exit). t− stats are
the t-statistics associated with the test-of-means. The test-of-means does not assume that the
variances of the two groups utilized in the tests are equal. All numbers are actual except noted
otherwise.
Mean Values
# of Developed Emerging
Item obs. Country Country t-stats
Panel A: Mean number of portfolio companies by industry and investment stage classification
Later Stage & Nonhitech 361 21.73 36.49 -6.517∗∗∗
Early Stage & Nonhitech 102 15.84 32.25 -4.443∗∗∗
Later Stage & Hitech 770 16.98 35.7 -12.064∗∗∗
Early Stage & Hitech 497 15.28 34.34 -10.213∗∗∗
Later Stage & Health Related 91 20.83 31.65 -2.152∗∗∗
Early Stage & Health Related 78 9.35 42.39 -6.440∗∗∗
Panel B: Mean per company investment by industry and investment stage classification ($’000s)
Later Stage & Nonhitech 361 5,507 1,340 1.447
Early Stage & Nonhitech 102 3,650 625 -2.541∗∗
Later Stage & Hitech 770 7,751 2,279 5.733∗∗∗
Early Stage & Hitech 497 6,132 2,126 4.246∗∗∗
Later Stage & Health Related 91 6,806 4,721 1.246
Early Stage & Health Related 78 5,082 2,532 1.178
Panel C: Mean venture capital firm capitalization ($ Millions) and number of venture funds
Capital 177 192 73 3.208∗∗∗
# of funds per venture capital firm 1899 2.698 4.273 -12.722∗∗∗
*** indicates significance at the 1%, confidence level
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Table III: Propensity to mildly concentrate investments in technology intensive ventures
The dependent variables are the three terciles of concentration in technology intensive ventures, while
independent variables are as described in Table AI. Tests are implemented using a multinomial logit
model that generates White (1980) robust z-statistics, and three specifications are reported.
Hitechqt2 is the middle tercile of concentration in technology intensive ventures. Venture capitalists
in the middle tercile are mildly concentrated in technology intensive ventures. The data consists of 4,200
funding transactions between sample venture capitalists and entrepreneurs from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃ-
cients reported are the marginal eﬀects, (the eﬀects at the mean) while z-statistics are reported in pare-
ntheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Hitechqt2
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Firmyear -.00785 -.00780 -.00608
(-3.47)∗∗∗ (-2.52)∗∗ (-2.69)∗∗∗
Early -.0483 -.0543 -.0176
(-2.18)∗∗ (-2.52)∗∗∗ (-0.73)
Lawenforcement -.1528
(-5.56)∗∗∗
Marketstructure -.2015
(-6.46)∗∗∗
Propertyrights .1041
(6.08)∗∗∗
Entrepreneurship -.0302 .0113 -.0451
(-0.90) (0.38) (-1.17)
Invbankaﬀvc -.0168 .00910 .0429
(-0.43) (0.23) (0.93)
Corporatevc -.0660 -.0425 -.1018
(-1.84)∗ (-1.19) (-2.90)∗∗∗
Commbankaﬀvc .0231 .0422 .0652
(0.42) (0.76) (1.10)
Govtaﬀvc .0724 .0723 .1070
(1.99)∗∗ (2.05)∗∗ (2.78)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.0958 0.1037 0.1273
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 2603 2727 2489
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
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Table IV: Propensity to mildly concentrate investments in non-technology intensive ventures
The dependent variables are the three terciles of concentration in non-technology intensive ventures, while
independent variables are as described in Table AI. Tests are implemented using a multinomial logit model
that generates White (1980) robust z-statistics, and three specifications are reported. Nonhitechqt2
is the middle tercileof concentration in non-technology intensive ventures. Venture capitalists in the middle
tercile are mildly concentrated in non-technology intensive ventures. The data consists of 4,200 funding
transactions between sample venture capitalists and entrepreneurs from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients
reported are the marginal eﬀects, (the eﬀects at the mean) while z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Nonhitechqt2
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Firmyear -.00376 -.00420 -.00425
(-2.09)∗∗ (-2.39)∗∗ (4.02)∗∗∗
Early .0454 .0325 .0911
(2.15)∗∗ (1.57) (4.02)∗∗∗
Lawenforcement -.1940
(-6.90)∗∗∗
Marketstructure -.2868
(-8.79)∗∗∗
Propertyrights .1099
(6.48)∗∗∗
Entrepreneurship .00810 .0500 -.0324
(0.21) (1.55) (-0.87)
Invbankaﬀvc -.00178 .0354 .1268
(-0.05) (0.97) (2.83)∗∗∗
Corporatevc .1551 .1690 .1501
(4.32)∗∗∗ (4.78)∗∗∗ (4.16)∗∗∗
Commbankaﬀvc -.1696 -.1405 -.1230
(-3.58)∗∗∗ (-2.97)∗∗∗ (-2.24)∗∗
Govtaﬀvc .0845 .0769 .1471
(2.40)∗∗∗ (2.25)∗∗ (3.78)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.1107 0.1149 0.1211
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 2603 2727 2489
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
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Table V: Propensity to mildly concentrate investments in early stage ventures
The dependent variables are the three terciles of concentration in early stage ventures, while independent
variables are as described in Table AI. Tests are implemented using a multinomial logit model that gene-
rates White (1980) robust z-statistics, and three specifications are reported. Earlyqt2 is the middle tercile
of concentration in early stage ventures. Venture capitalists in the middle tercile are mildly concentrated
in early stage ventures. The data consists of 4,200 funding transactions between sample venture capita-
lists and entrepreneurs from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects, (eﬀects at the
mean) while z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Earlyqt2
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Firmyear .00149 .00134 -.00107
(1.05) (0.96) (-0.72)
Nonhitech .0549 .0580 .0399
(2.22)∗∗ (2.43)∗∗ (1.59)
Lawenforcement -.0683
(-2.38)∗∗
Marketstructure -.1417
(-4.75)∗∗∗
Propertyrights .0543
(3.37)∗∗∗
Entrepreneurship -.0356 .000386 .0218
(-0.98) (0.01) (0.66)
Invbankaﬀvc -.0251 -.00421 -.00373
(-0.76) (-0.13) (-0.11)
Corporatevc -.0556 -.0462 -.1129
(-1.75)∗ (-1.49) (-3.94)∗∗∗
Commbankaﬀvc -.1682 -.1667 -.1739
(-4.36)∗∗∗ (-4.56)∗∗∗ (-4.34)∗∗∗
Govtaﬀvc -.2588 -.2484 -.3047
(-11.33)∗∗∗ (-11.46)∗∗∗ (-13.86)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.0949 0.1042 0.1247
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 2359 2727 2489
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
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Table VI: Propensity to mildly concentrate investments in later stage ventures
The dependent variables are the three terciles of concentration in later stage ventures, while independent
variables are as described in Table AI. Tests are implemented using a multinomial logit model that gene-
rates White (1980) robust z-statistics, and three specifications are reported. Laterqt2 is the middle tercile
of concentration in later stage ventures. Venture capitalists in the middle tercile are mildly concentrated
in later stage ventures. The data consists of 4,200 funding transactions between sample venture capitali-
sts and entrepreneurs from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects, (eﬀects at the
mean) while z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Laterqt2
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Firmyear -.00470 -.00469 -.00405
(-2.42)∗∗ (-2.53)∗∗ (-2.02)∗∗
Nonhitech .0250 .0256 .0165
(0.99) (1.06) (0.65)
Lawenforcement -.1259
(-4.53)∗∗∗
Marketstructure -.2290
(-6.93)∗∗∗
Propertyrights .0360
(2.40)∗∗
Entrepreneurship -.0934 -.0523 -.0394
(-2.72)∗∗∗ (-1.81)∗ (-1.21)
Invbankaﬀvc -.0791 -.0645 -.0850
(-2.35)∗∗ (-1.99)∗∗ (-2.43)∗∗
Corporatevc -.0255 -.0152 -.0600
(-0.70) (-0.42) (-1.68)∗
Commbankaﬀvc -.0623 -.0651 -.0500
(-1.28) (-1.44) (-0.95)
Govtaﬀvc -.0515 -.0491 -.00571
(-1.47) (-1.49) (-0.155)
Pseudo R2 0.0727 0.0813 0.0906
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 2359 2481 2489
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
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Table VII: Propensity to hold concentrated portfolios
The dependent variables are the three terciles of concentration in later stage ventures, early stage vent-
ures, technology and non-technology intensive ventures, while independent variables are as described
in Table AI. Tests are implemented using a multinomial logit model that generates robust z-statistics.
and four specifications are reported. Laterqt3, Earlyqt3, Nonhitechqt3, and Hitechqt3 are the third
terciles of concentration in later stage ventures, early stage ventures, technology and non-technology
intensive ventures. The data consists of 4,200 funding transactions between sample venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects, (eﬀects at the
mean) while z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Independent
Variables Earlyqt3 Hitechqt3 Nonhitechqt3 Laterqt3
Firmyear -.00584 .00778 -.00616 .00212
(-4.12)∗∗∗ (2.50)∗∗ (-3.78)∗∗∗ (1.29)
Nonhitech -.1432 .0896
(-5.75)∗∗∗ (3.65)∗∗∗
Early .0466 -.1297
(2.15)∗∗ (-5.58)∗∗∗
Propertyrights -.1650 -.0286 -.1063 .1287
(-10.46)∗∗∗ (-2.02)∗∗ (-7.41)∗∗∗ (7.62)∗∗∗
Entrepreneurship .0497 .1216 -.1522 -.1059
(1.27) (3.07)∗∗∗ (-3.56)∗∗∗ (-2.40)∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc -.1372 .0683 -.0453 .2581
(-3.82)∗∗∗ (1.68)∗ (-1.24) (6.66)∗∗∗
Corporatevc .1350 .0706 -.2226 -.0312
(3.55)∗∗∗ (2.11)∗∗ (-7.94)∗∗∗ (-0.94)
Commbankaﬀvc .1042 .0466 .1614 .1303
(1.61) (0.80) (2.42)∗∗∗ (2.24)∗∗
Govtaﬀvc .4778 -.1384 -.1190 -.2306
(14.83) (-4.47)∗∗∗ (-4.01)∗∗∗ (-8.46)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.1236 0.1273 0.1211 0.0891
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 2489 2489 2489 2489
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
75
Chapter III
Law, Growth Rates, and
Venture Capitalists’ Asset
Allocation Decisions
Lewis (1954) postulates that emerging countries are poor because they lack a
professional entrepreneurial class that continually reinvests earnings, instead
of consuming the earnings as rent. That is, the maximization of firm value
by taking advantage of current growth opportunities is secondary to the maxi-
mization of current personal consumption or social status in emerging countries
(or poor quality legal environments). Equivalently, entrepreneurs in emerg-
ing countries are characterized by sub-optimally low rate-of-time preferences.
This is a behavioral proposition.
Claessens and Laeven (2003), on the other hand, hypothesize that en-
trepreneurs in poor quality property rights environments are unwilling to in-
vest in intangible assets because of the risk of expropriation. Hence, they
predict that the demand for external financing in poor quality property rights
environments is sub-optimal. Ueda (2004) makes similar predictions. He pre-
dicts that entrepreneurs in poor quality property rights environments will be
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less likely to demand venture capital financing due to the risk of expropriation
by venture capitalists.
In this paper, I examine whether poor quality legal environments (poor
quality contract enforcement and property rights protection) adversely af-
fect the demand for additional rounds of venture capital financing (growth
financing), once a financing relationship has been established. I also examine
whether venture capitalists’ asset allocation decisions are correlated with long-
run country growth rates. This is a test of the eﬃciency of venture capitalists’
asset allocation decisions.
The empirical methodology utilized in this paper also enables me to distin-
guish between the eﬀect that the quality of the legal environment has on the
demand and supply of external financing. Hence, the results indicate whether
poor quality legal environments primarily aﬀect the demand for growth financ-
ing, the supply of growth financing, or both. Four classes of firms are included
in the empirical study: early stage technology, and non-technology intensive
ventures, and later stage technology, and non-technology intensive ventures.
Early stage ventures are in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle, while later
stage ventures are in the expansion stages of a firm’s growth cycle.
I find that the demand for growth financing is for the most part lower in
poor quality property rights environments. The only exception is the demand
for growth financing from later stage technology intensive ventures. For the
most part, the demand for growth financing is no lower in poor quality con-
tract enforcement environments relative to better quality contract enforcement
environments. The only exception is the demand for growth financing from
later stage technology intensive ventures.
The supply of growth financing is no lower in poor quality property rights
environments relative to better quality property rights environments. The
supply of growth financing in poor quality contract enforcement environments,
on the other hand, is lower for early stage technology intensive ventures, and
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later stage non-technology intensive ventures. Relative to high propensity for
entrepreneurship countries, the demand for growth financing in low propensity
for entrepreneurship countries is higher for early stage ventures, while it is
lower for later stage ventures.
The results in this paper indicate that once a financing relationship is
established, poor quality contract enforcement may either aﬀect the demand
for or the supply of growth financing, but not both. The supply-related
result is consistent with the empirical findings in Rajan and Zingales (1998)
and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), which find that firms have better
access to external financing to fund growth opportunities in better quality legal
environments.
The quality of property rights protection, on the other hand, only aﬀects
the demand for growth financing once a financing relationship has been es-
tablished. This finding is consistent with the prediction in Lewis (1954) that
the reason why emerging countries are poor is because they lack a profes-
sional entrepreneurial class that continually reinvests earnings, rather than
consuming them as rent. The results are also consistent with the prediction
in Claessens and Laeven (2003) that entrepreneurs in poor quality property
rights environments are characterized by unwillingness to invest due to the
risk of expropriation. However, Obrimah (2005b) finds that the quality of
property rights protection is not a risk factor. This indicates that the results
are only consistent with the prediction in Lewis (1954).
The prediction in Lewis (1954) is a behavioral proposition. However,
rent seeking behavior may also be a rational response to a lack of separation
between consumption and investment decisions. This is because entrepreneurs
in countries where access to consumption finance is relatively limited may start
firms primarily to finance consumption. In such countries, the marginal rate of
transformation will be sub-optimally low because the entrepreneur cannot take
on all positive net present value projects within his investment opportunity set.
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Consequently, the marginal rate of substitution will also be sub-optimally low;
the Fisher separation theorem16 will not hold; and the demand for external
financing will be sub-optimal.
This rational interpretation of the results possesses implications for de-
velopmental policies in and towards emerging countries. For the most part,
micro-credit schemes in emerging countries focus on the facilitation of en-
trepreneurship via the provision of small business financing. However, devel-
opmental policies that only provide funds for investment will be less successful
relative to developmental policies that also increase access to consumption fi-
nance. Hence, the results indicate that the facilitation of consumption finance,
which encompasses access to credit, insurance, savings, and transactional ser-
vices is as important as the facilitation of entrepreneurial finance in emerging
countries.
Furthermore, if the Lewis (1954) postulation is accurate, the facilitation
of consumption finance in emerging countries will assist in the creation and
growth of a professional entrepreneurial class that continually reinvests earn-
ings rather than consuming them as rent. This increase in the size of the
professional entrepreneurial class, and the attendant increase in savings, in-
vestments, and the demand for external financing will contribute towards a
higher level of financial development. Hence, as argued in Barr (2005), micro-
finance can play an important role in financial development and strengthen the
link between financial development, economic growth, and poverty alleviation.
The empirical results also show that venture capitalists’ asset allocation de-
cisions are significantly and positively correlated with long-run country growth
rates. This indicates that venture capitalists are allocating funds to their
best uses in poor quality legal environments. Obrimah (2005) finds that
the most constrained firms in poor quality legal environments are early stage
non-technology intensive ventures, followed by early stage technology intensive
ventures and later stage technology intensive ventures. In this paper, I find
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that the economic significance of the correlations between long-run country
growth rates and venture capitalists’ asset allocation decisions is greatest for
early stage non-technology intensive ventures, followed by early stage technol-
ogy intensive ventures and later stage technology intensive ventures.
These results provide additional corroboration for the eﬃciency of venture
capitalists’ asset allocation decisions in poor quality legal environments. Fur-
thermore, the results are consistent with the finding in Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt,
Laeven, and Levine (2005) that financial development has a greater eﬀect on
the growth rates of industries that rely on small firms for technological reasons.
That is, the results indicate that higher country growth rates in poor quality
legal environments are driven by the loosening of financial constraints on small
firms. This indicates that improving access to external financing for small and
medium scale enterprises is critical for economic growth and development in
poor quality legal environments (emerging countries).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I outlines the
analytical framework. Section II discusses the venture capital data utilized in
the empirical tests. Empirical results are reported in Section III. Robustness
and specification tests are reported in Section IV. Section V concludes.
I Analytical Framework
Venture capitalists’ propensity to concentrate investments in a particular class
of firms is utilized as a proxy for economic profits associated with investing in
that class of firms. Economic profits may exist either because supply lags de-
mand or due to venture capitalists’ ability to earn risk premiums for providing
financing in poor quality legal environments. The probability that venture
capitalists will specialize in providing financing to a particular class of firms,
j, increases with the size of economic profits associated with the provision
of financing to j-type firms. Hence, if economic profits associated with the
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provision of financing to j-type firms are greater than those associated with
k-type firms, venture capitalists will have a greater propensity to concentrate
investments in j-type firms relative to k-type firms.
This argument also extends across countries whenever capital markets are
not segmented. If economic profits associated with the provision of venture
capital financing to j-type firms are greater in country m relative to country
n, venture capitalists in country m will have a greater propensity to concen-
trate investments in j-type firms relative to venture capitalists in country n.
However, as venture capitalists make investments beyond the first round of
venture capital financing, their investments become concentrated in a small
number of firms, that is they lose diversification benefits.
Hence, changes in venture capitalists’ asset allocation decisions between
the first and subsequent rounds of venture financing are indicative of venture
capitalists’ responses to the increased risk of their portfolios. Changes in
asset allocation decisions between the first and subsequent rounds of venture
financing are also indicative of changes in demand-supply equilibrium during
the course of financing relationships. The empirical findings in Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) suggest that the
demand for growth financing will be lower in poor quality legal environments
relative to better quality legal environments.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
A The Demand for Growth Financing
Hypothesis 4 The demand for growth financing in poor quality legal envi-
ronments is lower than the demand for growth financing in better quality legal
environments.
Hypothesis four is tested using probit models, which are specified as follows:
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probability(j-typei) = β0 + β1growthj,c + β2lawenforcementj,c
+ β3bankregulationj,c + β4marketstructurej,c + β5propertyrightsj,c
+ β6firmyeari + β7firmtypei + β8entrepreneurshipj,c
+ β9fundcountryi + β10firstyearj + ²i. (III.1)
The probit models are implemented twice for each specification using data
on all financing rounds, and then using data only on first financing rounds.
The results from these two sets of empirical results are then compared. Empir-
ical results that utilize data on first financing rounds are reported in Obrimah
(2005) and are included in Appendix B, Tables BI through BIV.
The subscript j, c refers to company j located in country c,17 while the
subscript i refers to a venture capitalist providing financing. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capitalist’s invest-
ments are concentrated in j-type firms. Four classes of j-type firms are con-
sidered. These are early stage non-technology intensive ventures; early stage
technology intensive ventures; later stage non-technology intensive ventures;
and later stage technology intensive ventures. Early stage ventures are in the
early stages of a firm’s growth cycle (small firms), while later stages are in
the expansion stages of a firm’s growth cycle (relatively large firms). Agency
problems associated with investing in early stage and technology intensive ven-
tures are relatively more severe than those associated with investing in later
stage and non-technology intensive ventures. Appendix A (Table AII) details
the specific classes that make up these broad groupings.
Concentration in early stage non-technology intensive ventures is deter-
mined as follows. For each venture capital fund in the sample with investments
in non-technology intensive ventures, I determine total dollar disbursements
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to all non-technology intensive ventures in its portfolio as well as proportions
of the total disbursed to early stage non-technology intensive ventures. I then
divide the venture capital funds into three terciles based on the proportion
of their total investments disbursed to early stage non-technology intensive
ventures and venture capital funds located in the third tercile are deemed to
be ‘concentrated’ in early stage non-technology intensive ventures. Concen-
tration is similarly determined for all other classes of j-type firms.
The variable lawenforcement is a country’s ranking on the contract en-
forcement index developed by the Business Environmental Risk Guide (BERG),
while propertyrights is a country’s ranking on the property rights protection
index obtained from LLSV (1998). These variables are motivated in Section I.
Following, I motivate the other independent variables included in the empirical
tests. Detailed descriptions of all variables are provided in Table AI in the
Appendix, while correlations between the independent variables are reported
in Table AIV.
Country growth rates The financial development literature finds that fi-
nancial development is strongly linked with economic growth. This literature
includes King and Levine (1993), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Luintel
and Khan (1999). This link between financial development and faster eco-
nomic implies that faster economic growth may lead to the development of a
venture capital market. Furthermore, venture capitalists will be more likely
to concentrate investments in industries that are responsible for faster eco-
nomic growth. In this paper, I include GDP growth rates as an independent
variable that proxies for country-specific growth opportunities. This variable
is termed growth.
Banking regulation The supply of venture capital funds may be larger
in countries where banks can only hold the equity of non-financial firms in a
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venture capital subsidiary. This implies that the demand for growth financing
will increase with the extent to which banks are precluded from holding the
equity of non-financial firms. The banking regulation variable ranks countries
on a scale of one through four. A ranking of one indicates that commercial
banks are free to hold the equity of non-financial firms, while a ranking of
two indicates that they can only do this within an independent subsidiary.
A ranking higher than two indicates more restrictions on commercial banks’
abilities to hold non-financial equity. I obtain country classifications based
on this banking regulation from Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2001). This
variable is termed bankregulation.
Market structure Black and Gilson (1998) find that capital market struc-
ture (market-based versus bank-based) is a determinant of the level of venture
capital activity across countries. In market-based economies, the incentive
of an IPO exit, which creates a liquid asset for the entrepreneur increases the
demand for venture capital funds, which in turn leads to a greater supply of
venture capital funds and a higher level of venture capital activity. A larger
supply of venture capital financing is expected to increase the demand for ad-
ditional rounds of venture capital financing. The market structure variable is
constructed as the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. This variable
is termed marketstructure.
Entrepreneurship Given that I only observe completed deals, there is a
need to account for possible diﬀerences in deal flow across countries. Conse-
quently, I include measures of the propensity to take risks, or the propensity
for entrepreneurship in the tests implemented. Furthermore, the demand for
growth financing is expected to increase with the propensity for entrepreneur-
ship across countries. These variables are taken from the Global Competi-
tiveness Report published by the World Economic Forum. The two variables
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considered, one for the propensity to take risks and the other for the propen-
sity to innovate have a correlation of 0.83. Both variables have similar eﬀects
when included in the tests implemented, but only results with the propensity
for entrepreneurship/innovation are reported. These are continuous variables
and the entrepreneurship/innovation variable is termed entrepreneurship.
Location of venture capital fund The variable fundcountry is an indi-
cator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in an emerging
country (equivalently, poor quality legal environment). A positive regression
coeﬃcient (β9) on this variable indicates that venture capitalists in poor qual-
ity legal environments have a greater propensity to concentrate investments
in j-type firms relative to venture capitalists in better quality legal environ-
ments. Hence, this variable indicates whether economic profits that accrue
to venture capitalists are greater in poor quality legal environments relative
to better quality legal environments. If the coeﬃcient of fundcountry is
significant with the expected sign (positive), while the quality of legal envi-
ronment variables are not, this suggests that economic profits in poor quality
legal environments are also driven by venture capitalists’ ability to earn risk
premiums.
Venture capital fund related variables Venture capital firm specific
variables are included as independent variables in the tests implemented.
firmtype is the organizational form of a venture capital firm, which has
been shown to contain information about venture capitalists’ risk preferences
(Obrimah (2004), Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri (2003)). Appendix A (Table
AIII) reports the classification of venture capitalists according to organiza-
tional form. firmyear is the year in which a venture capital firm commenced
operations. This variable is included in the empirical tests because it is ex-
pected that venture capitalists’ asset allocations are aﬀected by how long they
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have been in business. firstyear is a dummy variable for the year in which a
financing relationship commenced. This variable accounts for possible changes
in venture capitalists’ investment opportunity sets over time.
Venture capital firm reputation The number of deals a venture capitalist
has participated in is utilized as a weight in the tests performed. This is based
on the following argument. Suppose at time t = 0, there exist four VCs (vca,
vcb, vcc and vcd), one of which (vca) is concentrated in technology intensive
ventures, while the others are not. Assume that at time t = 1, the demand for
venture capital financing from technology intensive ventures increases signifi-
cantly. Given that reputation and specialization are important in the venture
capital market,18 vca attracts a significant chunk of the increased demand, but
due to risk considerations is only able to soak up half of the increased demand.
vcb, on the other hand, is able to soak up more of the residual demand (35
percent) relative to vcc and vcd and ends up being classified as a concentrated
VC at time t = 1.
If vca and vcb are given equal weight in the empirical tests at t = 1,
vcb’s importance is overstated, while vca’s importance is understated. Hence,
in order to capture the demand dynamics, which is central to the research
question, it is important to capture the relative importance of vca and vcb.
The same argument applies to the country variables. If the demand for venture
capital financing is greater in better quality property rights environments,
then there may be more financing transactions in these countries and this
ought to be reflected in the empirical tests. This argument is supported by
the finding in Rajan and Zingales (1998) that financial development has a
significant impact on the growth of the number of firms. All empirical tests,
except the switching regressions are based on first financing rounds only.
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B Growth rates and venture capitalists’ asset allocation
decisions
Hypothesis 5 Venture capitalists’ asset allocations are eﬃcient, hence, they
are positively and significantly related to long-run economic growth in the cross-
section of countries. Venture capitalsits’ asset allocation decisions are good
proxies for the level of financial development, or the eﬃciency of capital allo-
cations across countries.
Most studies that examine the finance-growth nexus utilize measures of
stock market and banking sector development as proxies for financial devel-
opment. However, a vibrant venture capital market may exist in countries
whose level of financial development is relatively poor by these conventional
measures. Over time, there occurs a spillover from the venture capital market
to stock markets as more firms are able to go public; a spillover to the bank-
ing sector also occurs because firms that receive venture capital financing are
better capitalized and possess larger debt capacity.
The utilization of venture capitalists’ asset allocations as measures of ven-
ture capital activity also provides a means of determining whether venture
capitalists allocate fund resources to their most productive use. Tests of the
relationship between venture capitalists’ asset allocations and long-run eco-
nomic growth are specified as follows:
Growthi,c = α0 + α1Earlynontechqt2i,c + α2Earlynontechqt3
+ α3Entrepreneurshipj,c + α4Propertyrightsj,c + α5Structurj,c
+ α6Privatecreditj,c + α7Banksvscbnj,c + ²i (III.2)
where Privatecrediti,c (private credit by banks as a proportion of GDP),
Banksvscbni,c (the proportion of aggregate financing to the private sector un-
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dertaken by private banks) and Structuri,c (the extent to which capital mar-
kets are market-based), and are financial development, and legal environment
indicators taken from Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2001).
II Venture capital data
Venture capital markets in the sample countries are emerging markets that
for the most part, developed concurrently and experienced significant growth
starting in the late 1990s. Hence, diﬀerences in venture capitalists’ asset allo-
cation decisions cannot be attributed to diﬀerences in the relative maturities of
the venture capital markets in these countries. Furthermore, venture capital
markets in the sample emerging and developed countries are not segmented.
In fact, venture capitalists in some developed countries (Singapore and Hong
Kong in particular) raise venture capital funds for investments in the sample
emerging countries.19
Data on venture capital transactions are obtained from VentureXpert,
which is owned by Ventureeconomics. The cross-country data set consists
of 6,552 distinct venture capital investments during 4,264 distinct rounds of
venture financing. Venture capital firms located in the sample countries are
responsible for 67 percent of all sample transactions (4,200 observations), while
venture capitalists located primarily in the U.S. and the U.K. are responsible
for 33 percent of all sample transactions (2,352 observations).
These investments involve 2,857 portfolio companies located in Asia and
Israel that received their first round of funding from venture capitalists (VCs)
between 1982 and December 2000. The developed countries based on World
Bank classifications are: Australia, Hong Kong (China), New Zealand, Japan
and Singapore; while the emerging countries are: China, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Malaysia, Philippines, Korea, Republic, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.
This sample is obtained from a total database of 10,192 venture capital
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and private equity transactions. From this total sample, I eliminate:
1. All buyout transactions, since these are not standard venture capital
transactions (1,042 observations);
2. All venture capital relationships that did not commence prior to De-
cember 31, 2000 (1,815 observations); this ensures that I have at least
two-and-a-half years of data on each financing relationship;
3. All investments in the financial services industry (180 observations); as
well as any observation that does not specify the dollar value of each
round investment; the investment stage; the industry; and the name of
the portfolio company (603 observations).
This process resulted in the elimination of 3,640 data records. These in-
vestments involve 818 venture capital firms with 465 or 57 percent of these
venture capital firms located in the sample countries.20 Table I reports indus-
try and investment stage statistics by sample country for this data set. The
statistics reported in Table I indicate that technology intensive deals outnum-
ber non-technology intensive deals in practically all of the sample countries
regardless of the location of the venture capitalists providing financing. Also,
later stage deals outnumber early stage financing deals across all sample coun-
tries regardless of the location of the venture capitalists providing financing.
Panels A and B of Table II show that venture capitalists in poor quality
legal environments invest smaller amounts in a larger number of firms relative
to venture capitalists in better quality legal environments. On average, the
number of firms in emerging country-based venture capitalists’ portfolios is
2x the number of firms in developed country-based venture capitalists’ port-
folios. The amount disbursed by emerging country-based venture capitalists
to a single firm are about 0.2x to 0.33x the amounts disbursed by developed
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country-based venture capitalists. This is consistent with test-of-means statis-
tics reported in Panel C of Table II, which indicate that average capital under
management for emerging country-based venture capital firms is about 0.38x
average capital under management for developed country-based venture capi-
tal firms. These means are significantly diﬀerent at the 5 percent confidence
level.
About thirty percent of portfolio companies are non-technology intensive
companies in the cross-country sample. This proportion is very similar to
that reported in Obrimah (2004) for VCs in the U.S. Total funding com-
mitted to all sample companies amounts to $1.56 billion, with 31 percent (61
percent) being disbursed to non-technology intensive (respectively, technology
intensive) ventures.
Independent private partnerships, corporate venture funds and commercial
bank-aﬃliated venture capitalists (VCs), in that order, are responsible for most
of the sample transactions. All venture capital types invest in non-technology
intensive companies. The venture capital types with the largest proportions
of non-technology intensive companies in their portfolios are commercial bank-
aﬃliated VCs (33 percent), independent private partnerships (26 percent) and
corporate VCs (15 percent). Investments in early stage companies constitute
between 29 percent (for investment bank-aﬃliated VCs) and 60 percent (for
government-aﬃliated VCs) of all investment transactions.
Forty-three percent of sample portfolio companies are early stage ventures
at the first round of venture financing. Early stage ventures constitute a
significant minority amongst non-technology intensive ventures (32 percent),
a slight minority amongst technology intensive ventures (47 percent) and a
significant majority amongst medical/health-related ventures (60 percent). A
total of $780 million was disbursed to portfolio companies receiving their first
round of venture capital financing and 31 percent of this total went to early
stage ventures.
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Syndication is not very prevalent within this sample. Deals involving
syndications between the diﬀerent classes of VCs are also very few. The
percentage of deals involving independent private partnerships and at least one
other venture capital class range from 8 percent for commercial bank aﬃliated
VCs, to 16 percent for investment bank aﬃliated VCs. Syndication with
other classes of VCs, other than independent private partnerships is even less
prevalent. The proportion of deals involving a single class of VCs ranges from
79 percent for investment bank aﬃliated VCs, to 91 percent for independent
private partnerships. This lack of extensive syndication may be rational in
markets that are far from perfect, since information rents are likely to exist in
such markets.21
III Empirical Results and Interpretations
Results obtained from tests based on all financing rounds have to be juxtaposed
with those obtained using only first round financing deals. However, results
based only on first round financing deals are reported in Obrimah (2005). The
relevant tables from Obrimah (2005) are included in Appendix B, Tables BI
through BIV.
A Early stage non-technology intensive ventures
Test results reported in Table III indicate that the demand for growth financ-
ing decreases with Propertyrights, and Entrepreneurship. However, while
the initial demand for external financing is 18 percent higher in poor qual-
ity property rights environments (Table BI), the total demand for external
financing is only 12 percent higher in Table III. This reduction, which is eco-
nomically significant, indicates that the demand for growth financing is lower
in poor quality property rights environments.
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The coeﬃcientS of Fundcountry in specifications (2) and (5) are similar
in Tables III and BI, respectively. This indicates that venture capitalists’
propensity to concentrate investments in early stage non-technology intensive
ventures does not decrease significantly as they provide additional rounds of
financing. Hence, the results indicate that poor quality legal environments
only aﬀect the demand for growth financing and not the supply for this class
of firms. The coeﬃcient of Entrepreneurship in Table III is significant in
all specifications and is about 300 to 400 percent higher relative to the corre-
sponding coeﬃcient in Table BI. This indicates that the demand for growth
financing is significantly higher in low propensity for entrepreneurship coun-
tries.
B Early stage technology intensive ventures
Table IV reports test results where the dependent variable is an indicator
variable equal to one if a venture capitalist is concentrated in early stage
technology intensive ventures. The results indicate that the total demand for
external financing from this class of ventures decreases with Lawenforcement,
while it increases with Growth, and Bankregulation. The coeﬃcient of
Lawenforcement has about the same magnitude (see Table BII) as in Obrimah
(2005), indicating that the demand for growth financing is no diﬀerent from the
initial demand for external financing. However, the coeﬃcient of Fundcountry
is statistically insignificant in specification (2) of Table IV. A comparison with
specification 2 of Table BII indicates that the supply of growth financing is
lower in poor quality contract enforcement environments.
The coeﬃcient of Propertyrights is significant in Table BII, while it is not
significant in Table IV. This indicates that the demand for growth financing
is lower in poor quality property rights environments relative to better qual-
ity legal environments. The diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients of Fundcountry in
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specification (5) of tables BII and IV, is not economically significant, how-
ever, indicating that venture capitalists in poor quality legal environments are
no less likely to provide growth financing relative to those in better quality
legal environments. The demand for external financing also reduces with
Entrepreneurship, and the coeﬃcient is between 80 and 200 percent higher
relative to corresponding coeﬃcients in Table BII. This indicates that the
demand for growth financing is higher in low propensity for entrepreneurship
countries.
C Later stage technology intensive ventures
Table V reports test results where the dependent variable is concentration in
later stage technology intensive ventures. The results indicate that the total
demand for external financing increases with Lawenforcement,Marketstructure,
and Propertyrights. Relative to the initial demand for external financing (see
Table BIII), the coeﬃcients indicate that the demand for growth financing from
this class of firms is lower in poor quality contract enforcement environments.
The demand for growth financing is no lower in poor quality property rights
environments. The demand for growth financing is also higher in countries
that possess a higher propensity for entrepreneurship.
The coeﬃcient of Fundcountry is not significant in specification 2 of Table
V. This indicates that the supply of growth financing is no lower in poor
quality contract enforcement environments. The coeﬃcient of Fundcountry
in specification 5 of Table V, on the other hand, is about 28 percent smaller
than the corresponding coeﬃcient in Table BIII. This indicates that venture
capitalists in poor quality legal environments are more likely to supply growth
financing relative to those in better quality legal environments.
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D Later stage non-technology intensive ventures
Test results reported in Table VI indicate that the demand for growth fi-
nancing from later stage non-technology intensive ventures decreases with
Lawenforcement andMarketstructure, while it increases with Propertyrights.
Hence, while the initial demand for external financing is higher in better qual-
ity contract enforcement environments (Table BIV), the demand for growth
financing is significantly higher in poor quality contract enforcement environ-
ments. The results in Tables VI and BIV also indicate that the demand for
growth financing is higher in better quality property rights environments, and
more bank-based capital markets. The results indicate, also, that the de-
mand for growth financing is higher in high propensity for entrepreneurship
countries.
The coeﬃcient of Fundcountry is significant and negative in all specifica-
tions of Table VI. However, the coeﬃcient of Fundcountry is not significant
in specification 2 of Table BIV. This indicates that the supply of growth
financing is not lower in poor quality contract enforcement environments rel-
ative to better quality contract enforcement environments. The coeﬃcients
in all other specifications of Tables VI and BIV except for specification 5, also
indicate that the supply of growth financing is lower in poor quality legal en-
vironments. However, the supply of growth financing is not lower in poor
quality property rights environments.
E Discussion of Hypotheses one and two
Tables III through VI indicate that, for the most part, the demand for growth
financing is lower in poor quality property rights environments. The only
exception is the demand for growth financing from later stage technology in-
tensive ventures. The demand for growth financing is no lower, for the most
part in poor quality contract enforcement environments relative to better qual-
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ity contract enforcement environments . The only exception being the demand
for growth financing from later stage technology intensive ventures.
The supply of growth financing is no lower in poor quality property rights
environments. The supply of growth financing in poor quality contract en-
forcement environments is lower for early stage technology intensive ventures,
and later stage non-technology intensive ventures. The demand for growth
financing from entrepreneurs in low propensity for entrepreneurship countries
is higher for early stage ventures, while it is lower for later stage ventures rela-
tive to the demand for growth financing from entrepreneurs in high propensity
for entrepreneurship countries.
The results support the conjecture in hypothesis four that the demand for
growth financing is lower in poor quality property rights environments. The
results also indicate that once a financing relationship is established, poor
quality property rights environments only aﬀect the demand for growth fi-
nancing. These results are consistent with the prediction in Lewis (1954)
that the reason emerging countries are poor is because they lack a professional
entrepreneurial class that continually reinvests earnings rather than consum-
ing them as rent. However, rent-seeking behavior in emerging countries may
also be a rational response to a lack of separation between consumption and
investment decisions.
F Growth rates and venture capitalists’ asset allocation
decisions
Empirical results reported in Table VII indicate that higher asset allocations
to early stage non-technology intensive ventures are correlated with faster
economic growth. This result is robust to the inclusion of financial devel-
opment, and quality of legal environment variables that have been shown to
be associated with, or possess predictive power for long-run economic growth.
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However, the economic importance of venture capitalists’ asset allocation de-
cisions, as expected, are not as large as the economic eﬀects of Privatecredit
and Banksvscbn. These results are in line with hypothesis five, which pos-
tulates that venture capitalists’ asset allocations are significantly related to
country-level long-run economic growth rates.
Test results reported in Tables VIII and IX also indicate that higher asset
allocations to early and later stage technology intensive ventures, respectively,
are correlated with faster long-run economic growth. However, while both
middle and third terciles of concentration in early stage technology intensive
ventures are correlated with faster economic growth, only mild concentration in
later stage technology intensive ventures is consistently correlated with faster
long run economic growth. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the coeﬃcient
of the third tercile of concentration ceases to be significant in specifications
that include private credit as a proportion of GDP as an independent variable.
The coeﬃcient of Banksvscbn is not significant in specification (7) of both
tables VIII and IX, while the coeﬃcient of Privatecredit remains significant.
Also, though not reported, tests with asset allocations to later stage non-
technology intensive ventures as independent variables indicate that higher
asset allocations to this class of ventures are negatively associated with faster
long-run economic growth.
A comparison of the coeﬃcients of the asset allocation variables across
Tables VII through IX indicates that the coeﬃcients, and R-squareds in spec-
ification (7) are highest in Table VII, followed by those in Table VIII, while
they are lowest in Table IX. The reduction in the coeﬃcients between Tables
VII and VIII is about 50 percent, while that between Tables VIII, and IX is
only 28 percent.
This is in line with the findings in Obrimah (2005) that early stage non-
technology intensive ventures are the most financially constrained in poor qual-
ity legal environments followed by early and later stage technology intensive
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ventures, respectively. These results indicate that venture capitalists’ asset
allocations are significantly correlated with long-run economic growth. The
results also indicate that venture capitalists are rational in their asset alloca-
tion decisions.
IV Robustness and specification tests
One possible interpretation of test results in Tables III through VI is that the
relatively lower demand for growth financing in poor quality property rights
environments is due to the fact that venture capitalists in these countries are
financially constrained. Hence, they are either not able to meet additional
demands for external financing fully, or it takes longer to muster the funds
required for such growth investments. In the latter case, the duration between
financing rounds will be longer in poor quality legal environments, while fund
size will have a negative impact on the duration between financing rounds.
This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6 Duration between financing rounds decreases with capital un-
der management by venture capitalists, the quality of contract enforcement,
capital market structure, long-run country growth rates, and the quality of the
property rights environment if supply constraints are at least partly responsible
for the results in Tables III through VI.
The dependent variable is the duration between funding rounds. The
tests are implemented using a duration model such as those utilized in the
labor economics literature. A firm is assumed to have a certain probability of
receiving financing in each period. The instantaneous probability of receiving
financing is called the hazard rate, λ(t). λ(t) is defined as:
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λ(t) =
Probability of receiving funding between t and t+∆t
Probability of receiving funding after t
. (III.3)
To implement this methodology, I assume a Weibull distribution, which is
either an increasing, constant, or decreasing hazard distribution function. In
this study, failure is the receipt of funding given that a company has already
received at least one round of funding. The hazard function for the Weibull
distribution with parameters γ > 0 and α > 0 is specified as,
λ(t) = γαtα−1,
and increases or decreases monotonically. For parametric analysis, I adopt an
Accelerated Failure Time Model. That is, the hazard function λ(t) is specified
as,
λ(t;x) = λ0
h
te−Z
0β
i
exp (−Z 0β) , (III.4)
where λ0 is the baseline hazard corresponding to exp(·) = 1 or Z = 0. This is
a log-linear regression model with the covariates having a multiplicative eﬀect
on t rather than the hazard function and consequently, λ0 does not need to be
estimated. The covariates then have the eﬀect of accelerating (or decelerating)
the time to failure.22 The coeﬃcients βm, i = 1, ...m, are estimated via
Maximum Likelihood. Duration models have the added advantage of being
able to cater to censored data. In this particular analysis, some observations
are right-censored. That is, although I know when the funding relationship
begins, I cannot ascertain if the relationship is ongoing or not given certain
criteria. In this study, transactions involving companies that receive funding
after December 2001 are deemed to be ongoing relationships, and consequently
are right censored. This cutoﬀ point is appropriate given the mean sample
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duration of 0.92 years, and the fact that eighty five percent of all sample
durations are less than 1.5 years.23
The model specification is:
Durationj,r = exp[−(ω0 + ω1Rndnmbrj,r + ω2Rndtotlj,r + ω3Earlyj,r,
+ ω4Pubstatj + ω5Mktbkj + ω6Tanfxasstj
+ ω7Lawenforcementj,c + ω8Propertyrightsj,c
+ ω9Marketstructurej,c + ω10Growthj,c + ω11Entrepreneurshipj,c
+ ω12Capitali + ω13Firmtypei + ω14Firstyearj + ²j,r)] (III.5)
where Durationj,r is the time duration in months between rounds r and
r + 1 for company j, and all other variables are as described in Appendix A,
Table AI.
A Robustness results
The results of the duration model are reported in specifications (1) through (5)
of Table X. In line with hypothesis six, I find that the duration between financ-
ing rounds decreases with Growth, Marketstructure, and Propertyrights.
However, venture capitalists located in poor quality legal environments are
also characterized by shorter time durations between financing rounds. Fur-
thermore, the coeﬃcients of Fundcountry are economically and statistically
more significant relative to the macroeconomic variables in all specifications.
This indicates that these variables are capturing demand eﬀects, while the
Fundcountry variable captures the risk or supply eﬀects. The coeﬃcient of
Fundcountry is in line with expectations that venture capitalists in poor qual-
ity legal environments will monitor more intensely relative to those in better
quality legal environments.
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B Specification test
Specification tests indicate that the probit models utilized in the analyses are
well specified. The test of goodness-of-fit for the probit model where the
dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital-
ist is concentrated in early stage non-technology ventures yields a Pearson
χ2 statistic of 1410.26 that is significant at the one percent confidence level.
A stricter test of goodness of fit, the Hosmer-Lemeshow24 χ2 goodness of fit
statistic yields a test statistic of 113.38, which is significant at the one percent
confidence level. Furthermore, using the sample mean third tercile concen-
tration of 0.35 as a cutoﬀ point, I find that 77 percent of venture capital firms
that are classified as concentrated in non-technology intensive ventures are
correctly predicted by the model, while 80 percent of those classified as ‘not
concentrated’ in non-technology intensive ventures are correctly classified. In
all, the model correctly classifies 79 percent of the data. All of these statistics
indicate that the probit models are well specified.
V Conclusions
This paper finds that poor quality contract enforcement either aﬀects the de-
mand for or the supply of growth financing, but not both. Poor quality
property rights protection, on the other hand, only aﬀects the demand for
growth financing, with supply unaﬀected. The result pertaining to the qual-
ity of property rights protection is consistent with the prediction in Lewis
(1954) that the reason why emerging countries are poor is because they lack
a professional entrepreneurial class that continually reinvests earnings rather
than consuming it as rent. The paper argues that rent seeking behavior may
be a rational response to a lack of separation between consumption and in-
vestment decisions, which implies that the facilitation of consumption finance
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is as important as the facilitation of entrepreneurial finance in poor quality
legal environments or emerging countries.
This paper also finds that venture capitalists’ asset allocation decisions are
significantly and positively correlated with long-run economic growth. Fur-
thermore, the economic significance of these correlations increases with the
extent to which a particular class of firms is constrained with respect to access
to external financing in poor quality legal environments. The results indicate
that venture capitalists asset allocations in poor quality legal environments are
eﬃcient. That is, venture capitalists are allocating funds to their best uses.
The results are also consistent with the prediction in Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt,
Laeven, and Levine (2005) that financial development leads to faster economic
growth because of its eﬀect on small firms’ access to external financing. This
indicates that improving access to external financing for small and medium
scale enterprises is critical for economic growth and development in emerging
countries.
This paper finds that improving access to external financing for small and
medium scale enterprises is critical for economic growth and development in
emerging countries. However, this paper does not examine whether some fi-
nancing vehicles are better suited to achieving this objective relative to others.
For instance, is equity financing better suited to this purpose relative to debt
financing? This is a subject for future research.
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Notes
16The Fisher separation theorem states that: Given perfect and complete capital markets,
the production decision is governed solely by an objective market criterion (represented by
maximizing attained wealth) without regard to individuals’ subjective preferences that enter
into their consumption decisions (Copeland and Weston (1992, pg. 12).
17Venture capital funds providing financing to company j may be located in diﬀerent
countries.
18Gompers (1996), Hsu (2004)
19The Guide to Venture Capital in Asia (2000).
20We note here that discussions with Ventureeconomics indicate that the coverage of Asia
venture capital transactions in the VentureXpert database simply reflects the data that they
have been able to obtain so far and does not represent any bias on their part whatsoever.
The fact that macro characteristics of this unique data set correspond to macro data on
Asian countries and Israel obtained from the GVCA further lends credence to this assertion
21These statistics are not reported, but are available upon request from the author.
22Kalbfleisch, J. D., and R. L. Prentice, 2002, The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time
Data, Wiley-Interscience.
23Duration models are surveyed in Kiefer (1988).
24The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic is utilized instead of the standard Pear-
son goodness of fit statistic when the number of observations per covariate pattern is small.
In this study, the number of observations per covariate pattern is about 2, hence the Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic provides a stricter goodness of fit test relative to the Pear-
son statistic. In Using the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test, the number of groups is
usually limited to ten.
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A Data descriptions, constructions, and sources as appropriate
Table AI: Data Descriptions
This table describes all the data utilized in our analyses. The first 18 variables are items related
to the venture capital transactions and are obtained either from VentureXpert or the Guide to
Venture Capital in Asia. Sources are cited for all other variables. A venture capital firm is dee
med to be concentrated in a particular industry or portfolio item if its portfolio share in that in-
dustry or item lies in the third tercile of portfolio shares of all sample venture capitalists.
Symbol Description/Construction
Earlynontechfm Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is concentrated in early stage
non-technology intensive ventures.
Laternontechfm Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is concentrated in later stage
non-technology intensive ventures.
Earlyhitechfm Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital firm is concentrated in early stage
technology intensive ventures.
Laterhitechfm Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital firm is concentrated in early stage
technology intensive ventures.
Onetime Dummy variable = 1 if a financing deal involves only one round of financing.
Pubstat Dummy variable = 1 if a portfolio company eventually goes public, and 0
otherwise.
Nonhitechqt The three terciles of concentration in non-technology intensive ventures.
Fundcountry Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is located in a sample emerging
country.
Age Portfolio company’s age at first round of venture capital financing.
Firmyear The year a venture capital firm was set up.
Early Dummy variable = 1 if portfolio company in early stages of firm’s growth cycle.
IV C Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is an independent private partnership.
Invbankaffvc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is aﬃliated with an investment bank.
Corporatevc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is aﬃliated with a non-financial corp.
Commbankaffvc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is aﬃliated with a commercial bank.
Govtaffvc Dummy variable = 1 if a venture capital fund is government-owned or aﬃliated.
Capital Venture capital firm-reported capital under management (’$Millions).
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Table AI: Continued
Symbol Description/Construction
Entrepreneurship Country ranking of entrepreneurship and innovation by the World Economic Forum.
Taken from the Global Competitiveness Report (1996). Higher rankings imply higher
innovation capabilities.
Markettobook Industry-wide ratios of market to book value based on 2-digit sic codes. Ratios are
calculated separately for portfolio companies located in the emerging and developed
country sub-samples. Data are obtained from Compustat’s Global Vantage Database.
Tangibleassets Industry-wide ratios of property, plant, and equipment based on 2-digit sic codes.
Ratios are calculated separately for portfolio companies located in the emerging
and developed country sub-samples. Data are obtained from Compustat’s Global
Vantage Database.
Lawenforcement∗ Measures the relative degree to which contractual agreements are enforced and
complications presented by language and mentality diﬀerences. Scored 1-4, with
higher scores for superior quality, averaged over 1980-1989, and 1990- 995; Source:
Knack and Keefer (1995) using data from Business Environmental Risk Guide (BERG).
Growth Annual GDP growth; Source: World Development Indicators (2002).
Propertyrights∗ Rating of property rights on a scale of 1 to 5. The more protection private property
receives, the higher the score. Source: LLSV (1998b), using data from 1997 Index of
Economic Freedom.
Marketstructure Constructed as the ratio of stock market capitalization to total bank assets in any
given year; stock market capitalizations are obtained from the Emerging Stock
Markets Factbook, while total bank assets are obtained from Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Levine(2001).
Bankregulation∗ Ability of banks to own and control non-financial firms. Source: Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (1998). 1 indicates “unrestricted” (banks can engage in the full range of the
activity directly in the bank), 2 indicates “permitted” (the full range of those activities
can be conducted, but all or some of the activity must be conducted in subsidiaries),
3 indicates “restricted” (banks can engage in less than the full range of those activities,
either in thebank or subsidiaries) and 4 indicates “prohibited” (the activity may not be
conducted by the bank or subsidiaries).
* descriptions obtained from Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2001).
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Table AII: Industry and investment stage classifications
This table reports the industry, and investment stage classification
schemes employed in this paper. Hitech are technologically intensi-
ve inventures; Nonhitech are non-technologically intensive ventu-
res; while Medical are medical/health-related ventures. Actual clas-
sifications are obtained from VentureXpert. Portfolio companies in the
Start-up/Seed or Early stages of a firm’s life cycle are firms that are still
in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Firms classified as early
stage firms tend to be older and further on along the firm’s life cycle
relative to those classified as Start-up/Seed firms. Porfolio companies
in the expansion or later stages of a firm’s growth cycle are relatively
established firms who need financing primarily to fund growth oppor-
tunities. These are larger and older firms relative to Early Stage and
Start-up firms. Firms classified as later stage firms tend to be further
along on a firm’s life cycle relative to those classified as expansion
stage firms.
Actual
Classifications Broad Classifications in this paper
Panel A: Industry Classifications
Hitech Nonhitech Medical
Agr/Forestry/Fish ×
Biotechnology ×
Business Services ×
Communications ×
Computer Hardware ×
Computer Other ×
Computer Software ×
Construction ×
Consumer Related ×
Industrial/Energy ×
Internet Specific ×
Manufacturing ×
Medical/Health ×
Other ×
Semiconductor/Electr. ×
Transportation ×
Utilities ×
Panel B: Classifications by Investment Stage
Later Stage Early Stage
Early Stage ×
Expansion ×
Later Stage ×
Startup/Seed ×
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Table AIII: Classification of venture capitalists by organizational structure
This table reports the ‘venture capital type’ classification scheme employed in this paper. The row
items are the actual classifications of venture capital firms by organizational structure. These classi-
fications are obtained from VentureXpert. SBIC NEC are Small Business Investment Companies
(SBICs) not classified within any of the other VentureXpert classes. Fund of funds are venture capi-
tal funds that invest in other venture capital funds rather than investing directly in firms in need of
venture capital financing. All other ‘actual’ classifications are self-explanatory. The Broad classifi-
cations in this paper are five. These are IV C (Independent Venture Capitalist; Invbankaffvc (Invest-
ment Bank aﬃliated venture capitalist); Corporatevc (Corporate venture capitalist; Commbankaffvc
(Commercial Bank aﬃliated venture capitalist); and Govtaffvc (Government aﬃliated venture capitalist).
Actual
Classifications Broad Classifications in this paper
Com-
Invba- Corpo- mban- Govt-
IVC nkaﬀvc ratevc kaﬀvc aﬀvc
Aﬃliate of Other Financial Institution ×
Bank Group ×
Business Development Fund ×
Commercial Bank Aﬃliate ×
Corporate (non-financial) Aﬃliate ×
Corporate (non-financial) Venture Program ×
Investment Management Firm ×
Investment Bank & Aﬃliates ×
Other Government Program ×
Fund of Funds ×
Independent Private Partnership ×
SBIC NEC ×
State Govt. Aﬃliated Program ×
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Table AIV: Correlations Table for the cross-country sample
This table reports correlations between independent variables utilized in this paper. The data
comes from fourteen emerging and developed countries. The developed countries based on
World Bank classifications are: Australia, Hong Kong (China), New Zealand, Japan and Sin-
gapore; while the emerging countries are: China, India, Indonesia ,Israel, Malaysia, Philippines,
Korea, Republic, Taiwan (China) and Thailand. The data consists of 4,200 distinct venture
capital transactions between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists located within the sample
countries. Firmyear is the year a venture capital firm commenced operations; Growth is annual
GDP growth; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement across
countries; Bankregulation is the extent to which commercial banks are precluded from holding the
equity of non-financial firms; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP;
Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries;
Entrepreneurship is a ranking of the propensity for entrepreneurship/innovation across countries;
Fundcountry is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in an emerging
country; Invbankaffvc are Investment Bank aﬃliated venture capitalists; Corporatevc are venture
capitalists aﬃliated with non-financial corporations; Commbankaffvc are Commercial Bank aﬃliated
venture capitalists; Govtaffvc are government aﬃliated venture capitalists; Early is an indicator
variable equal to one if a firm was in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle when it received its
first round of financing; Gdppercapita is annual GDP Per Capita.
Lawe- Bank- Mark- Entre-
Firm- nforc- regu- etstru- Proper- prene-
year Growth ement lation cture tyrights urship
Firmyear 1.0000
Growth 0.1338 1.0000
Lawenforcement 0.0425 -0.5028 1.0000
Bankregulation -0.0994 0.6686 -0.6043 1.0000
Marketstructure 0.0336 -0.4845 0.7267 0.4052 1.0000
Propertyrights 0.2298 0.3707 0.4990 -0.1151 0.2933 1.0000
Entrepreneurship 0.1021 0.1262 -0.4193 -0.3299 -0.4199 -0.2764 1.0000
Fundcountry 0.0456 0.5692 -0.7865 0.3856 -0.7633 -0.3428 0.6220
Invbankaﬀvc -0.0246 -0.2964 0.1518 -0.2206 0.1402 -0.0799 -0.0116
Corporatevc 0.0806 0.1899 -0.0375 0.1034 0.0102 0.0986 0.0168
Commbankaﬀvc -0.1864 -0.0469 -0.2134 0.1313 -0.1306 -0.3308 0.0842
Govtaﬀvc -0.2620 -0.0029 -0.0484 0.1112 -0.0499 -0.0990 -0.0634
Early -0.0091 0.0564 -0.1197 0.0735 -0.0871 -0.0954 0.0878
Gdppercapita 0.1036 -0.2073 0.8987 -0.4031 0.5648 0.7253 -0.5220
Fund- Invb- Cor- Com- Gdpp-
coun- anka- pora- mban Govt- perc-
try ﬀvc tevc kaﬀvc aﬀvc Early apita
Fundcountry 1.0000
Invbankaﬀvc -0.1904 1.0000
Corporatevc 0.0688 -0.1250 1.0000
Commbankaﬀvc 0.1919 -0.1677 -0.1408 1.0000
Govtaﬀvc -0.1462 -0.1051 -0.0883 -0.1184 1.0000
Early 0.1479 -0.0999 0.0531 0.0454 0.1281 1.0000
Gdppercapita -0.6736 0.0418 0.0133 -0.2834 -0.0422 -0.1217 1.0000
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B Tables from Obrimah (2005)
Table BI: Concentration in early stage non-technology intensive ventures
The probit model estimated is
Earlynontechfm = β0 + β1growth+ β2Lawenforcement+ β3Bankregulation
+ β4Marketstructure+ β5Propertyrights+ β6Firmyear
+ β7Firmtype+ β8Entrepreneurship+ β9Fundcountry
+ β10Firstyear + ².
Earlynontechfm is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital fund’s investments are
concentrated in early stage non-technology intensive ventures. Growth is the growth rate of
GDP; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement across countries;
Bankregulation is the extent to which commercial banks are precluded from holding the equity
of non-financial firms; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP;
Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries; Firmyear
is the year a venture firm was founded; Firmtype is a venture capital firm’s organizational form
(IV C, Invbankaffvc, Corporatevc, Commbankaffvc, and Govtaffvc); Entrepreneurship
is a ranking of the propensity for entrepreneurship across countries; Fundcountry is an indi-
cator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in an emerging country; Firstyear
is the yeara portfolio company received its first round of venture capital financing. Data on
venture capital transactions are obtained from VentureXpert and consist of 4,200 funding
transactions between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs located in Asia and the Middle
East from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects (mean eﬀects), while
z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear -.00736 -.00657 -.0104 -.00768 -.00922
(-2.13)∗∗ (-1.89)∗ (-3.22)∗∗∗ (-2.22)∗∗ (-2.89)∗∗∗
Growth .000387
(0.05)
Lawenforcement .0171
(0.21)
Bankregulation .0603
(1.09)
Marketstructure .0372
(0.49)
Propertyrights -.1819
(-5.77)∗∗∗
Entrepreneurship -.0907 -.1073 -.1204 -.1329 -.0801
(-1.49) (-1.31) (-1.49) (-1.68)∗ (-1.04)
Fundcountry .3915 .3993 .4066 .4105 .2841
(8.22)∗∗∗ (5.70)∗∗∗ (7.00)∗∗∗ (6.55)∗∗∗ (5.08)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc .00541 .0352 .00899 .0205 -.1645
(0.07) (0.43) (0.11) (0.27) (-2.00)∗∗
Corporatevc .0367 .0587 .0375 .0407 .0728
(0.46) (0.70) (0.45) (0.51) (0.85)
Commbankaﬀvc .0520 .0893 .0471 .0764 -.0474
(0.57) (0.95) (0.51) (0.85) (-0.50)
Govtaﬀvc .3112 .3352 .4054 .3132 .3154
(4.29)∗∗∗ (4.67)∗∗∗ (5.10)∗∗∗ (4.41)∗∗∗ (3.87)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.1787 0.1595 0.2150 0.1767 0.2565
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 732 696 690 746 690
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
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Table BII: Concentration in early stage technology intensive ventures
The probit model estimated is
Earlytechfm = β0 + β1growth+ β2Lawenforcement+ β3Bankregulation
+ β4Marketstructure+ β5Propertyrights+ β6Firmyear
+ β7Firmtype+ β8Entrepreneurship+ β9Fundcountry
+ β10Firstyear + ².
Earlytechfm is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital fund’s investments are
concentrated in early stage technology intensive ventures. Growth is the growth rate of
GDP; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement across countries;
Bankregulation is the extent to which commercial banks are precluded from holding the
equity of non-financial firms; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to
GDP; Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries;
Firmyear is the year a venture firm was founded; Firmtype is a venture capital firm’s orga-
nizational form (IV C, Invbankaffvc, Corporatevc, Commbankaffvc, and Govtaffvc);
Entrepreneurship is a ranking of the propensity for entrepreneurship across countries;
Fundcountry is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in
an emerging country; Firstyear is the year a portfolio company received its first round of
venture capital financing. Data on venture capital transactions are obtained from Venture-
Xpert and consist of 4,200 funding transactions between venture capitalists and entrepre-
neurs located in Asia and the Middle East from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the
marginal eﬀects (mean eﬀects), while z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear -.00175 -.00230 -.00191 -.00153 -.00188
(-1.34) (-1.79)∗ (-1.37) (-1.16) (-1.37)
Growth .00214
(0.44)
Lawenforcement -.0939
(-1.72)∗
Bankregulation .0172
(0.62)
Marketstructure -.0102
(-0.24)
Propertyrights -.0751
(-3.96)∗∗∗
Entrepreneurship -.1099 -.1254 .0250 -.1043 -.00986
(-2.82)∗∗∗ (-2.60)∗∗∗ (0.42) (-2.42)∗∗ (-0.19)
Fundcountry .1255 .0929 .1207 .1213 .1011
(3.86)∗∗∗ (1.69)∗ (3.40)∗∗∗ (2.81)∗∗∗ (3.01)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc .0894 .0864 .0609 .0843 -.0102
(2.09)∗∗ (2.00)∗∗ (1.45) (2.04)∗∗ (-0.24)
Corporatevc -.0206 -.0342 -.0570 -.0170 -.0496
(-0.52) (-0.83) (-1.37) (-0.43) (-1.20)
Commbankaﬀvc .0144 .0202 -.00912 .0147 -.0175
(0.21) (0.28) (-0.13) (0.21) (-0.24)
Govtaﬀvc .1890 .1541 .2197 .1874 .1917
(4.13)∗∗∗ (3.33)∗∗∗ (4.60)∗∗∗ (4.12)∗∗∗ (3.92)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.0685 0.0746 0.0801 0.0717 0.0889
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 1725 1663 1563 1735 1563
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively
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TableBIII: Concentration in later stage technology intensive ventures
The probit model estimated is
Latertechfm = β0 + β1growth+ β2Lawenforcement+ β3Bankregulation
+ β4Marketstructure+ β5Propertyrights+ β6Firmyear
+ β7Firmtype+ β8Entrepreneurship+ β9Fundcountry
+ β10Firstyear + ².
Latertechfm is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital fund’s investments are
concentrated in later stage technology intensive ventures. Growth is the growth rate of
GDP; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement across countries;
Bankregulation is the extent to which commercial banks are precluded from holding the equ-
ity of non-financial firms; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP;
Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries;
Firmyear is the year a venture firm was founded; Firmtype is a venture capital firm’s organi-
zational form (IV C, Invbankaffvc, Corporatevc, Commbankaffvc, and Govtaffvc);
Entrepreneurship is a ranking of the propensity for entrepreneurship across countries;
Fundcountry is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in an
emerging country; Firstyear is the year a portfolio company received its first round of venture
capital financing. Data on venture capital transactions are obtained from VentureXpert and
consist of 4,200 funding transactions between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs located
in Asia and the Middle East from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects
(mean eﬀects), while z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear .00336 .00370 .00450 .00359 .00402
(1.65)∗ (1.67)∗ (2.21)∗∗ (1.69)∗ (2.06)∗∗
Growth .00148
(0.44)
Lawenforcement .0436
(0.89)
Bankregulation .0183
(0.69)
Marketstructure .0656
(1.80)∗
Propertyrights .0392
(2.15)∗∗
Entrepreneurship .0454 -.0121 .0451 .0135 .0346
(1.12) (-0.25) (0.81) (0.30) (0.68)
Fundcountry -.1472 -.0676 -.1742 -.0815 -.1459
(-4.31)∗∗∗ (-1.26) (-4.78)∗∗∗ (-1.84)∗ (-4.35)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc .0596 .0473 .0859 .0626 .1176
(1.31) (1.03) (1.97)∗∗ (1.40) (2.49)∗∗
Corporatevc -.0217 -.0354 -.00589 -.0303 -.00457
(-0.57) (-0.93) (-0.16) (-0.80) (-0.12)
Commbankaﬀvc .2411 .2273 .2406 .2439 .2560
(3.53)∗∗∗ (3.22)∗∗∗ (3.43)∗∗∗ (3.55)∗∗∗ (3.62)∗∗∗
Govtaﬀvc -.2021 -.1944 -.2452 -.2042 -.2420
(-4.86)∗∗∗ (-4.75)∗∗∗ (-5.62)∗∗∗ (-4.92)∗∗∗ (-5.47)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.0506 0.0462 0.0743 0.0544 0.0770
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 1725 1663 1563 1735 1563
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively
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Table BIV: Concentration in later stage non-technology intensive ventures
The probit model estimated is
Laternontechfm = β0 + β1growth+ β2Lawenforcement+ β3Bankregulation
+ β4Marketstructure+ β5Propertyrights+ β6Firmyear
+ β7Firmtype+ β8Entrepreneurship+ β9Fundcountry
+ β10Firstyear + ².
Laternontechfm is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital fund’s investments are
concentrated in later stage non-technology intensive ventures. Growth is the growth rate of
GDP; Lawenforcement is a ranking of the quality of contract enforcement across countries;
Bankregulation is the extent to which commercial banks are precluded from holding the
equity of non-financial firms; Marketstructure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to
GDP; Propertyrights is the extent to which property rights are protected across countries;
Firmyear is the year a venture firm was founded; Firmtype is a venture capital firm’s organi-
zational form (IV C, Invbankaffvc, Corporatevc, Commbankaffvc, and Govtaffvc);
Entrepreneurship is a ranking of the propensity for entrepreneurship across countries;
Fundcountry is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm is located in an
emerging country; Firstyear is the year a portfolio company received its first round of ven-
ture capital financing. Data on venture capital transactions are obtained from VentureXpert
and consist of 4,200 funding transactions between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
located in Asia and the Middle East from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal
eﬀects (mean eﬀects), while z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear .00597 .00420 .00395 .00565 .00358
(2.24)∗∗ (1.62) (1.36) (2.17)∗∗ (1.24)
Growth -.00907
(-1.67)∗
Lawenforcement .1107
(1.87)∗
Bankregulation -.0924
(-2.40)∗∗
Marketstructure .0689
(1.28)
Propertyrights .0650
(2.40)∗∗
Entrepreneurship -.0594 -.1589 -.0681 -.1069 -.0451
(-1.29) (-2.47)∗∗ (-1.25) (-1.81)∗ (-0.84)
Fundcountry -.2470 -.1054 -.2236 -.1999 -.2257
(-6.07)∗∗∗ (-1.56) (-5.36)∗∗∗ (-3.46)∗∗∗ (-4.79)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc -.0176 .0460 -.0326 -.0021 .0181
(-0.36) (0.88) (-0.69) (-0.04) (0.35)
Corporatevc -.1790 -.1598 -.1777 -.1863 -.1844
(-3.03)∗∗∗ (-2.79)∗∗∗ (-3.07)∗∗∗ (-3.46)∗∗∗ (-3.26)∗∗∗
Commbankaﬀvc -.0795 -.0473 -.0536 -.0699 -.0178
(-1.00) (-0.61) (-0.68) (-0.89) (-0.22)
Govtaﬀvc -.2191 -.2061 -.2835 -.2170 -.2698
(-4.32)∗∗∗ (-4.41)∗∗∗ (-5.70)∗∗∗ (-4.47)∗∗∗ (-5.08)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.1321 0.1303 0.1674 0.1263 0.1674
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 732 696 690 746 690
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
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Table I: Summary statistics for venture capital data by country
This table reports the industry, and investment stage distribution of the venture capital data
utilized in this paper. These data are obtained from VentureXpert and consist of 6,552 venture
capital transactions between entrepreneurs located in the fourteen sample countries and (1)
venture capitalists located in these sample countries (sample VCs); and (2) venture capitalists
located primarily in the U.S. and the U.K.(‘Other VCs’). Hitech are technology intensive ven-
tures; Nonhitech are non-technology intensive ventures; and Medical are medical or health
related ventures. Early Stage firms are firms in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle, while
Later Stage firms are firms in the expansion stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Details of industries
classified as Hitech, Nonhitech or Medical as well as firms classified as early stage or later stage
firms are provided in Table AII of the Appendix.
Transactions with sample VCs Transactions with other VCs
Panel A: Data descriptions by country and industry classification
Hit- Med- Nonhi- Hit- Med- Nonhi-
Country ech ical tech ech ical tech Total
Australia 444 122 287 160 34 90 1,137
China 72 15 34 100 11 39 271
Hong Kong 84 45 143 40 312
India 389 69 319 180 8 33 998
Indonesia 12 1 18 7 18 56
Israel 187 64 8 460 135 22 876
Japan 65 10 49 91 15 140 370
Korea 1,076 138 249 213 24 36 1,736
Malaysia 24 1 12 6 2 13 58
New Zealand 30 4 21 16 9 80
Philippines 9 7 8 25 49
Singapore 106 6 26 122 16 32 308
Taiwan 139 1 36 65 1 22 264
Thailand 4 13 6 5 9 37
Total 2,644 431 1,125 1,577 251 528 6,552
Panel B: Data descriptions by country and investment stage classification
Later Early Later Early
Country Stage Stage Stage Stage Total
Australia 577 276 181 103 1,137
China 72 49 94 56 271
Hong Kong 100 29 141 42 312
India 368 409 134 87 998
Indonesia 28 3 19 6 56
Israel 156 103 352 265 876
Japan 90 34 172 74 370
Korea 817 646 146 127 1,736
Malaysia 21 16 16 5 58
New Zealand 45 10 25 80
Philippines 15 1 26 7 49
Singapore 86 52 117 53 308
Taiwan 157 19 62 26 264
Thailand 12 5 10 10 37
Total 2,547 1,653 1,495 861 6,552
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Table II: Industry- and investment stage-based test-of-means results
This table reports the results of industry and investment stage based test-of-means. The data
consists of 4,200 funding transactions between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists located
within the sample countries from 1982 to 2003. Nonhitech are non-technology intensive ven-
tures, Hitech are technology intensive ventures, while Health Related are medical/health related
ventures. Early Stage firms are firms in the early stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Later Stage
firms are firms in the expansion stages of a firm’s growth cycle. Capital is total capital under
management by a venture capital firm (includes funds committed to venture capitalists but not
yet disbursed and investments from which venture capitalists are yet to exit). t− stats are
the t-statistics associated with the test-of-means. The test-of-means does not assume that the
variances of the two groups utilized in the tests are equal. All numbers are actual except noted
otherwise.
Mean Values
# of Developed Emerging
Item obs. Country Country t-stats
Panel A: Mean number of portfolio companies by industry and investment stage classification
Later Stage & Nonhitech 361 21.73 36.49 -6.517∗∗∗
Early Stage & Nonhitech 102 15.84 32.25 -4.443∗∗∗
Later Stage & Hitech 770 16.98 35.7 -12.064∗∗∗
Early Stage & Hitech 497 15.28 34.34 -10.213∗∗∗
Later Stage & Health Related 91 20.83 31.65 -2.152∗∗∗
Early Stage & Health Related 78 9.35 42.39 -6.440∗∗∗
Panel B: Mean per company investment by industry and investment stage classification ($’000s)
Later Stage & Nonhitech 361 5,507 1,340 1.447
Early Stage & Nonhitech 102 3,650 625 -2.541∗∗
Later Stage & Hitech 770 7,751 2,279 5.733∗∗∗
Early Stage & Hitech 497 6,132 2,126 4.246∗∗∗
Later Stage & Health Related 91 6,806 4,721 1.246
Early Stage & Health Related 78 5,082 2,532 1.178
Panel C: Mean venture capital firm capitalization ($ Millions) and number of venture funds
Capital 177 192 73 3.208∗∗∗
# of funds per venture capital firm 1899 2.698 4.273 -12.722∗∗∗
*** indicates significance at the 1%, confidence level
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Table III: Concentration in early stage non-technology intensive ventures
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm’s inv-
estments are concentrated in early stage non-technology intensive ventures, while indep-
endent variables are as described in Table AI. Tests are implemented using a probit model
that generates White robust z-statistics, and five specifications are reported. The data co-
nsists of 4,200 funding transactions between sample venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects, (mean eﬀects) while z-sta-
tistics are reported in parentheses. Tests utilize data on all financing rounds from a finan-
cing relationship.
Independent Dependent Variable: Earlynontechfm
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear -.00513 -.00434 -.0132 -.00489 -.0114
(-1.40) (-1.17) (-4.01)∗∗∗ (-1.34) (-3.40)∗∗∗
Growth .0104
(1.54)
Lawenforcement .1143
(1.23)
Bankregulation .1180
(1.84)∗
Marketstructure .0965
(1.15)
Propertyrights -.1283
(-3.87)∗∗∗
Entrepreneurship -.3195 -.4042 -.2260 -.3739 -.2619
(-4.20)∗∗∗ (-3.99)∗∗∗ (-2.22)∗∗ (-4.31)∗∗∗ (-2.82)∗∗∗
Fundcountry .3341 .4285 .3326 .3921 .2856
(6.08)∗∗∗ (5.09)∗∗∗ (4.99)∗∗∗ (6.37)∗∗∗ (4.36)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc .3193 .3676 .2874 .3185 .1340
(4.46)∗∗∗ (4.80)∗∗∗ (3.88)∗∗∗ (4.56)∗∗∗ (1.55)
Corporatevc .1719 .1599 .1464 .1614 .1761
(2.21)∗∗ (1.97)∗∗ (1.75)∗ (2.05)∗∗ (2.08)∗∗
Commbankaﬀvc .1582 .1962 .1362 .1635 .0859
(1.71)∗ (2.02)∗∗ (1.32) (1.80)∗ (0.86)
Govtaﬀvc .4374 .4588 .5187 .4344 .4712
(5.83)∗∗∗ (5.99)∗∗∗ (6.48)∗∗∗ (5.76)∗∗∗ (5.78)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.1756 0.1853 0.2054 0.1877 0.2197
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 1098 1046 1043 1112 1043
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
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Table IV: Concentration in early stage technology intensive ventures
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm’s inv-
estments are concentrated in early stage technology intensive ventures, while independ-
ent variables are as described in Table AI. Tests are implemented using a probit model th-
at generates heteroskedastic-consistent z-statistics, and five specifications are reported.
The data consists of 4,200 funding transactions between sample venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects (mean)
eﬀects), and z-stats are reported in parentheses. Tests utilize data on all financing rounds
from a financing relationship.
Independent Dependent Variable: Earlytechfm
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear .00340 .00300 .00311 .00355 .00309
(1.71)∗ (1.57) (1.34) (1.79)∗ (1.30)
Growth .0123
(3.05)∗∗∗
Lawenforcement -.1075
(-2.22)∗∗
Bankregulation .0690
(2.58)∗∗∗
Marketstructure -.0461
(-1.09)
Propertyrights -.0248
(-1.34)
Entrepreneurship -.1860 -.2549 .0482 -.1936 -.0740
(-4.56)∗∗∗ (-4.95)∗∗∗ (0.82) (-4.48)∗∗∗ (-1.51)
Fundcountry .0693 .0584 .0533 .0614 .0853
(2.10)∗∗ (1.13) (1.50) (1.43) (2.53)∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc .0396 .0226 -.0398 .0152 -.0641
(0.89) (0.48) (-0.89) (0.35) (-1.40)
Corporatevc -.0867 -.0857 -.1367 -.0760 -.1295
(-2.48)∗∗ (-2.42)∗∗ (-3.66)∗∗∗ (-2.18)∗∗ (-3.47)∗∗∗
Commbankaﬀvc .0818 .0815 .0461 .0829 .0515
(1.26) (1.21) (0.64) (1.26) (0.71)
Govtaﬀvc .3930 .3413 .3591 .3844 .3523
(7.39)∗∗∗ (6.51)∗∗∗ (6.75)∗∗∗ (7.32)∗∗∗ (6.53)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.0935 0.0938 0.0873 0.0948 0.0851
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 2589 2489 2389 2599 2389
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively
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Table V: Concentration in later stage technology intensive ventures
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm’s inv-
estments are concentrated in later stage technology intensive ventures, while independent
variables are as described in Table AI. Tests are implemented using a probit model that ge-
nerates heteroskedastic-consistent z-statistics, and five specifications are reported. The data
consists of 4,200 funding transactions between sample venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects (mean eﬀects), and z-stats
are reported in parentheses. Tests utilize data on all financing rounds from a financing
rounds from a financing relationship.
Independent Dependent Variable: Latertechfm
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear .000420 .000576 .00303 .000595 .00269
(0.21) (0.29) (1.68)∗ (0.30) (1.54)
Growth -.00319
(-0.78)
Lawenforcement .0928
(1.91)∗
Bankregulation -.0135
(-0.59)
Marketstructure .0819
(2.22)∗∗
Propertyrights .0388
(2.23)∗∗
Entrepreneurship .1116 .1231 -.0208 .0921 .0131
(2.53)∗∗ (2.33)∗∗ (-0.37) (2.09)∗∗ (0.30)
Fundcountry -.0938 -.0439 -.1068 -.0328 -.1050
(-2.63)∗∗∗ (-0.84) (-2.97)∗∗∗ (-0.74) (-3.07)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc .0855 .0720 .1517 .1018 .1829
(1.86)∗ (1.54) (3.47)∗∗∗ (2.21)∗∗ (3.95)∗∗
Corporatevc -.00767 -.0166 .0208 -.0187 .0178
(-0.21) (-0.45) (0.60) (-0.51) (0.51)
Commbankaﬀvc .2918 .2937 .2886 .2937 .2911
(3.81)∗∗∗ (3.70)∗∗∗ (3.60)∗∗∗ (3.75)∗∗∗ (3.60)∗∗∗
Govtaﬀvc -.2384 -.2267 -.2364 -.2383 -.2339
(-5.42)∗∗∗ (-5.04)∗∗∗ (-4.76)∗∗∗ (-5.36)∗∗∗ (-4.63)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.0470 0.0533 0.0609 0.0557 0.0629
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 2589 2489 2389 2599 2389
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively
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Table VI: Concentration in later stage non-technology intensive ventures
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a venture capital firm’s inv-
estments are concentrated in later stage non-technology intensive ventures, while indep-
endent variables are as described in Table AI. Tests are implemented using a probit mo-
del that generates heteroskedastic-consistent z-statistics, and five specifications are repo-
rted. The data consists of 4,200 funding trans-actions between sample venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs from 1982 to 2003. Coeﬃcients reported are the marginal eﬀects, (mean
eﬀects) while z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Tests utilize data on all financing
rounds from a financing relationship.
Independent Dependent Variable: Laternontechfm
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firmyear .00881 .00632 .00888 .00816 .00730
(2.48)∗∗ (1.83)∗ (2.41)∗∗ (2.27)∗∗ (1.94)∗
Growth .00907
(1.61)
Lawenforcement -.1012
(-1.80)∗
Bankregulation -.00273
(-0.06)
Marketstructure -.1276
(-2.38)∗∗
Propertyrights .1048
(3.50)∗∗∗
Entrepreneurship .0723 .000245 .1308 .1363 .0981
(1.46) (0.00) (2.18)∗∗ (2.26)∗∗ (1.64)∗
Fundcountry -.3422 -.3643 -.3288 -.4376 -.2463
(-7.37)∗∗∗ (-5.93)∗∗∗ (-6.52)∗∗∗ (-7.16)∗∗∗ (-4.84)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc -.2138 -.2123 -.2139 -.2384 -.1954
(-5.35)∗∗∗ (-5.29)∗∗∗ (-5.38)∗∗∗ (-5.63)∗∗∗ (-4.07)∗∗∗
Corporatevc -.0480 -.0384 -.0512 -.0318 -.0643
(-0.73) (-0.58) (-0.77) (-0.46) (-0.99)
Commbankaﬀvc -.1405 -.1532 -.1087 -.1687 -.0755
(-1.90)∗ (-2.11)∗∗ (-1.35) (-2.21)∗∗ (-0.86)
Govtaﬀvc -.2033 -.2160 -.2518 -.2251 -.2411
(-5.06)∗∗∗ (-5.86)∗∗∗ (-8.12)∗∗∗ (-5.25)∗∗∗ (-7.46)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.1937 0.2095 0.2152 0.2299 0.2339
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
# of obs 1098 1046 1043 1112 1043
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
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Table VII: Venture capitalists’ asset allocations, and long-run economic growth I
The dependent variable is long-run economic growth, while independent variables are the proportions
of venture capitalists’ portfolio allocated to early stage non-technology intensive ventures, as well as
financial development, and quality of legal environment variables. All of the data, other than the port-
folio concentrations and Entrepreneurship (see Table A1) are obtained from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(2001). Earlynontechqt2, and Earlynontechqt3 are the second, and third terciles of portfolio concen-
tration in early stage non-technology intensive ventures. The data consists of 4,200 funding transa-
ctions between sample venture capitalists and entrepreneurs from 1982 to 2003. The tests are implem-
ented using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and White robust t-stats are reported in parentheses.
Independent Dependent variable: Growth
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entrepreneurship 1.8893 2.1581 1.6360 2.6213 2.9908 4.4388
(7.31)∗∗∗ (6.76)∗∗∗ (6.38)∗∗∗ (7.54)∗∗∗ (6.05)∗∗∗ (5.84)∗∗∗
Earlynontechqt2 1.2780 1.8076 1.7742 1.7103 1.8129 1.286
(4.26)∗∗∗ (5.73)∗∗∗ (5.90)∗∗∗ (8.21)∗∗∗ (5.88)∗∗∗ (6.00)∗∗∗
Earlynontechqt3 .6232 2.0266 1.6351 1.7328 2.2814 1.114
(3.21)∗∗∗ (8.86)∗∗∗ (7.69)∗∗∗ (10.83)∗∗∗ (10.67)∗∗∗ (5.27)∗∗∗
Propertyrights 1.1881 -2.7611
(11.36)∗∗∗ (-2.77)∗∗∗
Structur 8.6008 5.3316
(13.05)∗∗∗ (0.58)
Privatecredit 2.9882 4.6649
(20.68)∗∗∗ (17.91)∗∗∗
Banksvscbn 14.4298 14.5626
(16.22)∗∗∗ (3.15)∗∗∗
# of obs 958 935 958 955 888 865
R-squared 0.1024 0.2697 0.2638 0.5145 0.3666 0.6752
p−value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 1% significance level.
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Table VIII: Venture capitalists’ asset allocations, and long-run economic growth II
The dependent variable is long-run economic growth, while independent variables are the proportions
of venture capitalists’ portfolio allocated to early stage technology intensive ventures, as well as fina-
ncial development, and quality of legal environment variables. All of the data, other than the portfolio
concentrations and Entrepreneurship (see Table AI) are obtained from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(2001). Earlytechqt2, and Earlytechqt3 are the second, and third terciles of portfolio concentration
in early stage technology intensive ventures. The data consists of 4,200 funding transactions betw-
een sample venture capitalists and entrepreneurs from 1982 to 2003. The tests are implemented using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and White robust t-stats are reported in parentheses.
Independent Dependent variable: Growth
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entrepreneurship .5233 .9445 .4553 .8947 .4519 4.6969
(1.59) (2.83)∗∗∗ (1.60) (2.76)∗∗∗ (0.95) (3.46)∗∗∗
Earlytechqt2 .9768 1.3126 1.4832 1.0988 1.1345 .5864
(5.38)∗∗∗ (7.00)∗∗∗ (8.51)∗∗∗ (8.79)∗∗∗ (6.10)∗∗∗ (4.58)∗∗∗
Earlytechqt3 .7380 1.2276 1.2714 1.1609 1.0704 .6499
(3.81)∗∗∗ (5.87)∗∗∗ (6.57)∗∗∗ (8.71)∗∗∗ (5.13)∗∗∗ (5.21)∗∗∗
Propertyrights 1.6335 1.1781
(22.66)∗∗∗ (1.15)
Structur 7.1889 3.6857
(15.22)∗∗∗ (1.49)
Privatecredit 3.8779 6.3693
(27.26)∗∗∗ (16.56)∗∗∗
Banksvscbn 15.8482 -28.686
(29.37)∗∗∗ (-2.59)∗∗∗
# of obs 2283 2165 2283 2283 2124 2006
R-squared 0.0299 0.2586 0.1761 0.5072 0.2321 0.6402
p−value 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 1% significance level.
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Table IX: Venture capitalists’ asset allocations, and long-run economic growth III
The dependent variable is long-run economic growth, while independent variables are the proportions
of venture capitalists’ portfolio allocated to early stage technology intensive ventures, as well as fina-
ncial development, and quality of legal environment variables. All of the data, other than the portfolio
concentrations and Entrepreneurship (see Table AI) are obtained from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(2001). Latertechqt2, and Latertechqt3 are the second, and third terciles of portfolio concentration
in later stage technology intensive ventures. The data consists of 4,200 funding transactions between
sample venture capitalists and entrepreneurs from 1982 to 2003. The tests are implemented using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and White robust t-stats are reported in parentheses.
Independent Dependent variable: Growth
Variables (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Entrepreneurship .3622 .8963 .3166 .8217 .4301 4.9030
(1.13) (2.80)∗∗∗ (1.14) (2.50)∗∗ (0.93) (3.61)∗∗∗
Latertechqt2 1.3188 .9389 1.3193 .5820 .8767 .4222
(7.22)∗∗∗ (4.57)∗∗∗ (7.54)∗∗∗ (4.42)∗∗∗ (4.32)∗∗∗ (4.07)∗∗∗
Latertechqt3 .8311 .4540 .6033 -.0117 .4472 .0770
(4.68)∗∗∗ (2.22)∗∗ (3.45)∗∗∗ (-0.08) (2.24)∗∗ (0.59)
Propertyrights 1.5047 1.2307
(18.85)∗∗∗ (1.20)
Structur 6.0854 3.9641
(14.09)∗∗∗ (1.60)
Privatecredit 3.7274 6.4475
(25.22)∗∗∗ (17.28)∗∗∗
Banksvscbn 14.3260 -30.339
(23.64)∗∗∗ (-2.74)∗∗∗
# of obs 2283 2165 2283 2283 2124 2006
R-squared 0.0540 0.2333 0.1637 0.4764 0.2144 0.6352
p−value 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 1% significance level.
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Table X: Duration between financing rounds and agency problems
The dependent variable is the duration to next financing round, and coeﬃcicients are interpreted
as the time ratio eﬀect of a variable on the mean time to next financing round. Tests are impleme-
nted using a duration model that assumes a Weibull distribution, and five specifications are repo-
rted. The data consists of 4,200 funding transactions between sample venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs from 1982 to 2003. Rndnmbr is the number of a particular financing round,
Rndtotl is the total amount disbursed to portfolio company during a round of venture capital
financing. The other independent variables are as described in Table AI, while White (1980) ro-
bust z-stats are reported in parentheses.
Independent Dependent Variable: Duration
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rndnmbr .9922 .9931 .9932 .9935 .9951
(-1.51) (-1.37) (-1.37) (-1.37) (-1.10)
Rndtotl .9999 .9999 .9999 .9999 1.0000
(-0.66) (-0.77) (-0.73) (-0.88) (0.98)
Early .9949 .9939 .9946 .9948 .9867
(-0.32) (-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.34) (-0.89)
Mktbk .9927 .9925 .9924 .9930 .9933
(-2.75)∗∗∗ (-2.78)∗∗∗ (-2.83)∗∗∗ (-2.82)∗∗∗ (-2.74)∗∗∗
Tangasst 1.013 1.0128 1.0129 1.0127 1.0162
(1.06) (1.03) (1.06) (1.07) (1.34)
Pubstat .9567 .9596 .9584 .9563 .9700
(-1.90)∗ (-1.73)∗ (-1.84)∗ (-1.97)∗∗ (-1.50)
Growth .9952
(-1.65)∗
Lawenforcement 1.0072
(0.26)
Entrepreneurship 1.0335
(1.01)
Marketstructure .9507
(-1.82)∗
Propertyrights .9751
(-1.76)∗
Fundcountry .9476 .9402 .9281 .9061 .9272
(-2.25)∗∗ (-2.05)∗∗ (-2.73)∗∗∗ (-2.99)∗∗∗ (-2.71)∗∗∗
Invbankaﬀvc 1.0453 1.0536 1.0500 1.0531 1.0466
(1.78)∗ (2.08)∗∗ (2.02)∗∗ (2.08)∗∗ (2.07)∗∗
Corporatevc 1.0266 1.0261 1.0263 1.0258 1.0287
(0.84) (0.79) (0.83) (0.84) (0.93)
Commbankaﬀvc .9773 .9847 .9809 .9810 .9702
(-1.19) (-0.80) (-1.03) (-1.08) (-1.39)
Govtaﬀvc 1.0392 1.0334 1.0311 1.0322 1.0483
(0.96) (0.81) (0.78) (0.82) (1.21)
Capital .9999 .9999 .9999 .9999 .9999
(-1.42) (-1.04) (-1.52) (-1.63) (-1.72)∗
Wald χ2 40.34 39.72 40.83 43.97 46.00
p−value 0.0197 0.0229 0.0174 0.0053 0.0030
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
indicate significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% confidence levels respectively
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